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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The primary goal of this study is to present the results of a 
comprehensive scope of key opportunities and challenges for 
harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development 
at the regional level in Southern Africa. The main objectives 
were as follows: 
•	 Provide	an	overview	of	regional	migration	stocks	and	
flows identifying regional trends, drivers and impacts 
from existing research literature and official data;
•	 Profile	 migrant	 characteristics	 at	 the	 regional	 level	
including demographic composition, types of migration 
and occupational profile;
•	 Examine	the	relevance	of	multilateral,	continental	and	
regional migration instruments, policies, protocols, 
agreements and forums with a view to identifying actions 
required to move the regional migration management 
agenda forward and align with the goal of enhancing 
migration for inclusive growth and development in 
Southern Africa;
•	 Analyze	the	key	initiatives,	opportunities	and	obstacles	
to developing a coherent, integrated and rights-regarding 
approach to migration management including areas of 
common commitment and ownership, and points of 
actual and potential conflict and disagreement between 
states;
•	 Conduct	a	gender	analysis	of	regional	migration	dynam-
ics including gender dimensions of migration, challenges, 
dangers and vulnerabilities confronting migrant women 
and other vulnerable groups, and gender analysis of 
migration management in Southern Africa;
•	 Identify	potential	programming	areas	that	are	weak	or	
underdeveloped.
The report relies on data and information from four main 
sources: (a) existing research literature and data on regional 
migration dynamics and trends in Southern Africa; (b) 
official data sources, where available, to identify current 
patterns, trends and types of migration; (c) bilateral global 
migration data sets compiled by the UNDP and the World 
Bank; and (d) a programme of field research involving key 
informant interviews and consultations with stakeholders, 
international organizations and donors, national govern-
ment departments, and representatives from civil society, 
business, labour and the academy. Country visits were 
undertaken to South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe. A total of 60 interviews were conducted with 86 
interviewees.
The first two sections of the report outline the objectives and 
methodology of the research. The third section provides a 
contextual analysis of regional migration in Southern Africa 
to demonstrate that migration is a quintessentially regional 
issue and development challenge. There are a number of 
reasons why a regional – as opposed to a purely national – 
conceptual and policy approach to migration is desirable 
and necessary: 
•	 Cross-border	movements	of	people	have	a	long	history	
and constitute one of the major mechanisms of regional 
integration in Southern Africa (along with trade and 
investment). Goods and capital move relatively freely 
and legally across the region but people still face consid-
erable obstacles and barriers to movement; 
•	 Vast	differences	in	levels	of	development	and	employ-
ment opportunities across the region have led to 
extremely uneven migration flows. All countries both 
send and receive migrants but the balance between the 
two varies significantly. Zimbabwe was a major destina-
tion before 2000 but has since become the region’s single 
largest exporter of migrants. South Africa is the major 
destination;
•	 Temporary,	circular	migration	is	the	norm	in	the	region	
with migrants retaining close ties with home countries 
and communities through formal and informal transfers 
of cash and goods in the form of remittances. In effect, 
migration and remittances have become a major source 
of development finance across the region; 
•	 The	majority	of	migration	movements	within	and	to	the	
Southern African region fall into the category of South-
South migration. This form of migration, from one 
developing country to another, can have positive and 
simultaneous development impacts on both countries 
of origin and destination;
•	 From	a	migration	management	perspective,	 regional	
organizations have recognized the importance of regional 
harmonization and co-ordinated action. However, gov-
ernments have been slower to recognize the reality of 
regional migration, leading to a disjuncture between 
initiatives to facilitate movement and co-ordinate migra-
tion for development at the continental and regional 
level, and national governments that tend to view migra-
tion negatively and avoid any binding commitment to 
regional migration processes and instruments.
The analysis of migration trends and flows distinguishes 
between (a) migration within the Southern African region 
from one country to another; (b) migration to Southern 
Africa from other countries, especially the rest of Africa; 
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and (c) migration from Southern Africa to other parts of the 
globe. Each has implications and opportunities for harness-
ing migration for development and inclusive growth. For 
example:
•	 All	 of	 the	 countries	 of	 Southern	 Africa	 host	 some	
migrants, with the major migration destinations being 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Bot-
swana. All are also migrant-sending countries with the 
major intra-regional senders being Mozambique, Zim-
babwe, Lesotho, Malawi and Angola. Even South Africa 
sends migrants to other countries in the region. In pol-
icy terms, this means that although many countries are 
threatened by what they view as an uncontrolled influx 
of migrants, they are themselves also migrant senders 
and beneficiaries of out-migration to other countries.
•	 Migration	flows	within	the	region	have	undergone	major	
changes in the last two decades, including a significant 
decline in forced (refugee) migration, an equally signifi-
cant increase in migration for economic and livelihood 
reasons, more diversity in flows including increasing 
female and youth migration, a decline in formal contract 
migration to South African mines, and a concomitant 
increase in unregulated, informalized migration across 
borders. Data and reliable information on all of these 
trends and their drivers are largely absent. 
•	 In	total,	53%	of	all	Southern	Africa-born	migrants	are	
living outside the region. The five major sending coun-
tries are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, the DRC and 
Mauritius. The five major destinations are the United 
Kingdom, Australia, France, the United States and Por-
tugal. Shared histories and common languages have 
resulted in the emergence of migration corridors that 
include South Africa-UK, South Africa-Australia, Angola-
Portugal, Zimbabwe-UK and Madagascar-France. The 
majority of migrants who leave the region are relatively 
skilled, leading to claims that countries of destination 
are responsible for a “brain drain” from the region. This 
argument has largely been replaced by the realization 
that these migrants are actually a resource with a poten-
tially strong development role to play. 
Against the backdrop of complex and shifting migration pat-
terns and flows, the report identifies key development-related 
implications of these migration trends and characteristics 
and presents relevant information and data on each. This 
provides substantive context and a link to the program-
ming recommendations later in the report. The five areas 
are: (a) gender and migration; (b) migrant rights and pro-
tections; (c) migration and remittances; (d) migration and 
informal entrepreneurship and (e) diasporas for develop-
ment. Although the available information on each area is 
uneven across the region, evidence is marshalled to sug-
gest that each offers important opportunities for meeting 
the overall goal of harnessing migration for development 
and inclusive growth. These areas are united by a focus on 
the importance and development implications of women’s 
migration. The major findings from the analysis of these five 
areas include the following:
•	 Southern	Africa	is	undergoing	a	process	of	feminization	
of migration with increased independent women’s migra-
tion. The number of female migrants in SADC is now 
over 2 million. In the major destination country (South 
Africa), the proportion of female migrants has reached 
40%	of	the	total.	Gender-disaggregated	data	on	migrant	
flows and occupations is generally unavailable, although 
South African data suggests that a migrant woman has 
only	a	56%	probability	of	being	employed	compared	to	
a migrant man. 
•	 There	is	a	growing	body	of	case-study	evidence	on	infor-
mal temporary migration and the low wage regime and 
exploitative conditions in sectors such as construction, 
illicit mining, commercial agriculture and domestic 
work. For those migrant women who are employed, 
many are engaged in precarious livelihoods. Some are 
employed in potentially exploitative conditions with 
weak oversight or protection of their labour rights, for 
example as domestic or agricultural workers. Others are 
engaged in inherently precarious informal occupations 
such as trading, hair braiding and other beauty services, 
or craft production and sales, often conducted in unsafe 
spaces. Related to their precarious working and living 
conditions, female migrants experience gender-based 
violence and other health vulnerabilities. 
•	 Poor	treatment	of	female	migrants	on	the	way	to	and	at	
the workplace exercises an extremely negative impact 
on the migrants themselves and their households, and 
is also antithetical to development and inclusive growth 
in their home countries. Low wages and other forms of 
financial extortion, for example, significantly reduce the 
remitting ability of migrants. Precarious employment in 
the agricultural and domestic service sectors is highly 
gendered with female migrants being most vulnerable to 
exploitation by formal and informal labour brokers and 
recruiters, employers and the authorities (especially the 
police). 
•	 There	 is	a	considerable	evidence	that	remitting	 is	an	
extremely common practice in Southern Africa. How-
ever, much remitting is through informal channels, and 
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accurate data on remittance flows at the regional level is 
not available. The World Bank calculates that remittance 
flows to the countries of Southern Africa reached USD1 
billion in 2014. Only a third of remittances to Southern 
African countries come from other countries within the 
region. Over two-thirds of remittances to Southern Afri-
can countries therefore come from outside the region. 
•	 Globally,	female	migrants	send	approximately	the	same	
per capita amount of remittances as male migrants but 
women tend to send a higher proportion of their income. 
Women also usually send money more regularly and for 
longer periods of time than men. In Southern Africa 
there is some evidence of distinct gender differences in 
remitting amounts, frequency and means of remitting, 
remittance recipients and use of remittances. This sug-
gests that data, research and policy-making on migration 
and remittances needs to be gender-disaggregated. 
•	 The	 number	 of	migrants	 running	 small	 and	micro-
enterprises or being employed by these businesses is 
considerable in towns and cities across the region. In 
South Africa, as many as one-third of migrants are self-
employed in the informal economy. Surveys of migrant 
entrepreneurs show that the sector is dominated by 
young people and that women occupy particular niches. 
Informal business owners have positive development 
impacts in countries of destination and origin through 
remittance of business profits, generating employment, 
rental of business properties, providing cheaper services, 
supporting formal sector businesses and payment of 
operating licences to municipalities.
•	 The	major	challenges	to	business	survival	and	expansion	
include difficulties of securing start-up capital and busi-
ness loans from formal financial institutions, especially 
banks; lack of basic business training and skills; exclusion 
from formal banking systems; vulnerability to xeno-
phobic attacks and destruction of stock and businesses 
premises; and hostile operating environments including 
official harassment, extortion and demands for bribes or 
protection money. 
•	 While	many	 governments	 are	 developing	 plans	 and	
policies for diaspora engagement, an important informa-
tion gap concerns the attitudes of diasporas themselves 
to engagement in development-related activities and 
initiatives in their countries of origin. A study of the 
global Zambian diaspora showed that most are inter-
ested in making private investments in Zambia, with 
the greatest sectoral interest in agriculture/horticulture, 
import/export, manufacturing, tourism and transport. 
Many expressed interest in contributing to development 
projects in Zambia related to education, healthcare, 
infrastructure development, childcare and microfinance 
initiatives. 
•	 A	study	of	immigrants	from	the	SADC	in	Canada	found	
that many felt they have an important role to play 
in developing their countries of origin. The majority 
remit money to their country of origin. Preferred ave-
nues of engagement include skills transfer, investing 
in businesses, participation in development projects, 
educational exchanges, volunteer work, fundraising for 
development projects, philanthropy, export and import 
of goods to and from the country of origin, investing 
in infrastructural development and providing distance 
learning. Others specifically mentioned their desire to be 
involved in activities that would lead to greater empow-
erment for women and children.
The next section of the report examines the policy impli-
cations of the information about migration flows and 
development implications provided in the previous section. 
There was a considerable degree of unanimity among the 
stakeholders interviewed for this study on the importance of 
seeing migration as a regional development issue requiring 
a co-ordinated regional response in Southern Africa. There 
was some expectation of a difference in opinion between 
regional and national stakeholders. However, many of the 
latter were also willing to acknowledge that migration was 
not purely an issue of national importance. Where they dif-
fered was on who should be driving the agenda: national 
governments or regional bodies.
In principle, there is significant awareness among SADC 
member states about the need to strengthen efforts aimed at 
harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development. 
In practice, little progress has been made on mainstream-
ing migration and development at the national or regional 
policy level. Regional efforts to forge a common approach 
to migration appear promising but, while states appear 
willing to make initial commitments to agreements, instru-
ments and initiatives, they are generally unwilling to ratify 
and implement anything that appears to infringe on their 
national sovereignty or the perceived interests of citizens. 
At the regional level, there is a paucity of instruments that 
focus directly on migration and development. An evalua-
tion of the SADC Secretariat’s Regional Indicative Strategic 
Development Plan (RISDP) has concluded that “the relation-
ship between migration and poverty is under-represented in 
the plan’s proposed intervention areas and only addressed 
in a partial and circumscribed manner.” Freedom of intra-
regional movement has been a principle of the SADC since 
its foundation, although this is not explicitly tied to positive 
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development outcomes. Despite this objective, unfettered 
free movement is very far from being a reality. The Secretar-
iat has had no success in getting all member states to ratify 
its two major regional mobility policy initiatives: the 1995 
Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the 
2005 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons. 
Greater regional mobility initiatives are trumped by national 
immigration policies focused on movement control. 
SADC member states prefer to act bilaterally in their dealings 
with each other on migration through instruments such as 
Joint Permanent Commissions (JPCs) and Memoranda of 
Understanding. At the level of individual member states, the 
mandate and expertise required for, and resources devoted 
to, migration management is often limited to routine and 
operational capacity requirements, as opposed to a more 
strategic approach in which migration management is an 
essential component of development objectives.
Little discernible progress has therefore been made with 
regard to the implementation of a free movement regime 
by the SADC Secretariat. In part, this is because there is very 
little data or analysis on exactly what the impact of remov-
ing border controls in the region would be. In many ways, 
the SADC is already a de facto free movement zone and the 
removal of controls would not have a massive impact on 
migration flows. What it would do is provide legal chan-
nels for those who want to migrate, reduce the opportunities 
for personal enrichment by corrupt state functionaries on 
both sides of borders, eliminate current high levels of cor-
ruption and abuse in the immigration system and reduce the 
exploitation of migrants who enjoy few rights and protec-
tions. However, free movement is likely to remain politically 
unpalatable to most states for the foreseeable future. 
One of the key components of inclusive growth strategies is 
poverty reduction through productive and decent employ-
ment. Given the high levels of poverty and inequality 
throughout Southern Africa, it is important to view migrant 
employment rights as an integral part of the inclusive growth 
agenda. The SADC Secretariat has made various efforts to put 
in place instruments that commit member states to protect-
ing the rights of migrant workers. A recent study for the 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) examined the issue of migrant protection and 
rights in the Southern African region as a whole and identi-
fied the various regional-level commitments to protecting 
migrant rights and the obstacles to their implementation. 
This report examines various instruments including the UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, the Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights in SADC, the SADC Code on 
Social Security, ILO Conventions 87, 100, 111 and 182, the 
Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Work-
ers (Domestic Workers Convention), the SADC Protocol on 
Employment and Labour, and the SADC Regional Labour 
Migration Policy Framework and concludes that, as with the 
effort to implement freedom of movement, ratification and 
implementation are proving problematical as few member 
states are willing to ratify the appropriate instruments. A 
gender analysis of the various African Union (AU) and SADC 
strategic instruments shows that gender and migration issues 
feature only in piecemeal fashion.
Regional-level instruments, polices and protocols do exist, 
but these are barely enforced and national laws and insti-
tutions take precedence. The persistent limitations of 
migration governance on the continent are recognized as 
an obstacle to regional and continental poverty reduction. 
Furthermore, policies and instruments to protect migrant 
and gender rights are implemented within a difficult social 
and political context in which xenophobic and patriar-
chal attitudes persist. In sum, there are many challenges in 
advancing gender-sensitive, rights-based migration govern-
ance in the SADC region. The scale, complexity and diversity 
of migration, combined with incomplete and inconsistent 
data, make it difficult to measure and monitor the gender 
composition of migrant flows and stocks, or to understand 
the particular contributions and vulnerabilities of female 
migrants. A dual focus on empowerment and protection 
should guide programming and policy development on 
gender and migration in the region.
The final section of the report makes specific recommen-
dations for a future regional programme on harnessing 
migration for development and inclusive growth. Given the 
lack of progress at regional and national level in advancing 
a migration and development agenda, we argue that pro-
gramming should focus on “demonstration” projects that 
provide clear evidence of the development impacts of migra-
tion for countries of origin and destination. These projects 
could then be scaled up. In order to establish priority entry 
points, the report does three things: 
•	 Presents	the	results	of	the	stakeholder	perceptions	of	pri-
orities in which knowledge and information gaps were a 
recurrent theme; 
•	 Analyzes	and	categorizes	the	recommendations	for	mak-
ing migration work for development in the SDGs, the 
Valetta Accord and various AU and SADC agreements, 
protocols and instruments; 
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•	 Develops	a	Programming	Framework	(PF)	consisting	of	
10 core migration and development issues and 27 associ-
ated potential entry points; and
This analysis leads to the identification of five major entry 
points in the programming framework under the general 
rubric of a recommended programme on Gender and Migra-
tion for Development and Inclusive Growth in Southern 
Africa. For each point, the report provides a detailed ration-
ale, examples of similar programmes and likely outcomes. In 
summary, the five recommended entry points are as follows:
•	 Entry Point One: Building a Gendered Knowledge 
Base on Migration. One of the recurrent themes in the 
stakeholder interviews was (a) the limited public avail-
ability and utility of official data on migration; and (b) 
the lack of knowledge about regional migration causes, 
volumes, experiences and impacts. A common failing of 
official data and the case-study research literature is the 
absence of systematic and generalizable information on 
the gendered nature of migration. In order to provide 
detailed, policy-relevant, gender-disaggregated data on 
migration and its development impacts, a different meth-
odological approach is needed. There is a need for the 
collection of national migration data at the household 
level in countries of origin and destination through the 
implementation of nationally representative surveys of 
migrant-sending households. The knowledge and policy 
value of this kind of methodology is clearly illustrated by 
previous projects with dated findings that are still widely 
cited as authoritative sources of data on all aspects of 
migration, including its gender dimensions. These sur-
veys would ensure the collection of data on a range of 
critical migration and development issues including 
migration drivers, migrant characteristics and motiva-
tions, migrant occupations and remitting behaviour, 
remittance channels and uses, and general migration 
impacts at the household, community and national 
scales. 
•	 Entry Point Two: Protecting Female Migrants in 
Domestic Work. The SADC Labour Migration Policy 
Framework has as two of its objectives (a) strengthening 
protection of the rights of migrant workers; and (b) har-
nessing positive gender considerations and demographic 
dividends. These objectives urgently need to be realized 
in the low-wage sectors in which migrant women and 
girls tend to concentrate, especially domestic work. A 
programme focus on the rights and protection of women 
and girl migrants would materially advance the objec-
tives of the Framework and potentially enhance its 
implementation as well as that of the Domestic Work-
ers Convention. We therefore recommend a regional 
programme directed at improving the conditions for 
women and youth migrating to and working in the 
domestic service sector. The extent to which employers, 
labour brokers and governments are in breach of the 
Convention is unknown and needs to be systematically 
researched. Further, programmes are needed to inform 
domestic workers of their rights and employers of their 
obligations. Because most migrant women in domestic 
work tend to move along major migration corridors there 
is a strong case for adopting a corridor-focused approach 
to programme implementation. Two corridors in par-
ticular are known to be significant avenues for migrant 
women in domestic work: the Zimbabwe-Gauteng-West-
ern Cape corridor and the Lesotho-Gauteng corridor. By 
focusing attention on these two corridors, identifying the 
problems that migrant domestic workers face and that 
materially affect the employment conditions of migrant 
women, this intervention could have a strong demon-
stration effect on the need to protect and guarantee the 
rights of vulnerable workers and ensure that they benefit 
from inclusive economic growth. 
•	 Entry Point Three: Maximizing Remittance Impacts 
for Women Migrants. As the primary source of income 
for the majority of migrant-sending households, remit-
tance earnings are vital in enabling households to meet 
their basic needs. Food is the most common annual 
expenditure of remittance money in both male and 
female migrant-sending households. Remittances do 
not appear to be spent on non-essential or luxury items 
but nor are they commonly directed towards savings 
or investment in business or other productive activi-
ties. While there is a need for updated regional data 
on the gendered dimensions of remitting, the priority 
now is to devise practical, actionable programmes of 
support which would turn remittances from meeting 
basic household consumption needs into sources of 
productive investment by recipients at the household 
and community levels. There is considerable global and 
regional debate about how best to harness remittances 
for development and inclusive growth. The Scaling Up 
Remittances (SURE) programme of the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a potential 
model for this programme. However, IFAD’s rural focus 
assumes that such programmes should concentrate on 
rural areas, whereas it is far more likely that the opportu-
nities for the productive use of remittances are greater in 
urban areas. Thus, we suggest that programming should 
focus more on urban-urban remitting to have tangible 
results and benefits for inclusive growth.
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•	 Entry Point Four: Enhancing Female and Youth 
Migrant Entrepreneurship. In cities throughout South-
ern Africa, migrants from other countries (including 
forced migrants) are involved in the establishment of 
small businesses to support themselves and their families 
and to generate remittances to send back to their home 
countries. There is a common perception that migrant 
entrepreneurs are “survivalists” , forced to establish their 
businesses because of a failure to obtain formal employ-
ment. However, there is a growing body of research that 
highlights the entrepreneurial orientation and motiva-
tion of the majority of migrant business owners. Studies 
have identified the following as major business chal-
lenges: (a) economic challenges including shortages of 
start-up capital, lack of access to credit, competition from 
formal sector outlets and suppliers’ high prices; (b) social 
challenges such as prejudice against their nationality and 
xenophobic attacks; and (c) security challenges such as 
crime and theft, confiscation of goods by the police, har-
assment and demands for bribes and protection money, 
and physical attacks. Despite these problems, migrant 
entrepreneurs deliver important development benefits 
to countries of origin (through remittances) and desti-
nation (including cheaper foodstuffs and consumables, 
credit facilities, and job creation, as well as generating 
economic profits for formal sector suppliers such as 
wholesalers and supermarkets). Migrant entrepreneurs 
in general, and women and youth in particular, are still 
in need of programmes of support in order to address 
some of the obstacles they face and to maximize their 
entrepreneurial activities and contributions. There is a 
dearth of programmes supporting migrant youth and 
women’s small and micro-entrepreneurship activities and 
initiatives in Southern Africa, particularly as migrants are 
generally excluded from government training and sup-
port programmes. 
•	 Entry Point Five: Deploying Diaspora Skills for 
Women/Youth Empowerment. There is increasing 
interest in the actual and potential role of diasporas 
as a resource for development and inclusive growth in 
Africa. Diasporas possess five forms of diaspora capital 
(the “5 Cs”): intellectual capital, financial capital, politi-
cal capital, cultural capital and social capital. In order 
for African governments and regional organizations 
to engage effectively with diasporas, it is important to 
understand what motivates diasporas to be involved 
in African development: the “3 Ps” of pecuniary inter-
ests, private interests and public philanthropic interests. 
The global Southern African diaspora represents a large 
skills and expertise pool, several million strong, that has 
not yet been effectively leveraged for development by 
Southern African countries. A regional diaspora engage-
ment policy for Southern Africa as a whole needs to be 
based on (a) a mapping of existing development-related 
initiatives by members of diasporas from Southern Africa; 
(b) information about the types of engagement activities 
that members of the diaspora are interested in support-
ing or participating in at the regional level; and (c) the 
establishment of mechanisms which would enable and 
facilitate engagement at the regional level, perhaps 
initially in the form of a platform or marketplace for 
supporting regional projects. To align this proposal with 
the general theme of gender and migration, such a pro-
gramme could focus on diaspora support for projects that 
aim to enhance gender equity and the empowerment of 
women and girls. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
GOAL AND OBJECTIVES
The primary goal of this study is to present the results of a 
comprehensive scope of key opportunities and challenges for 
harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development 
at the regional level in Southern Africa.1 The main objectives 
of the study were as follows: 
•	 Provide	an	overview	of	regional	migration	stocks	and	
flows identifying regional trends, drivers and impacts 
from existing research literature and official data;
•		 Profile	 migrant	 characteristics	 at	 the	 regional	 level	
including demographic composition, types of migration 
and occupational profile;
•		 Examine	the	relevance	of	multilateral,	continental	and	
regional migration instruments, policies, protocols, 
agreements and forums with a view to identifying actions 
required to move the regional migration management 
agenda forward and align with the goal of enhancing 
migration for inclusive growth and development in 
Southern Africa;
•	 Analyze	the	key	initiatives,	opportunities	and	obstacles	
to developing a coherent, integrated and rights-regarding 
approach to migration management including areas of 
common commitment and ownership, and points of 
actual and potential conflict and disagreement between 
states;
•		 Conduct	a	gender	analysis	of	regional	migration	dynam-
ics including gender dimensions of migration, challenges, 
dangers and vulnerabilities confronting migrant women 
and other vulnerable groups and gender analysis of 
migration management in Southern Africa; and
•		 Inventory	 current	 regional	 migration	 initiatives	 by	
governments, inter-governmental agencies, the private 
sector, civil society and other development partners and 
identify potential programming areas that are weak or 
underdeveloped.
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CHAPTER 2:  
METHODOLOGY
The report relies on data and information from four main 
sources: 
•	 Existing	research	literature	and	data	on	regional	migra-
tion dynamics and trends in Southern Africa. The 
research literature is voluminous but generally adopts 
a small-area, small-sample case study approach which 
raises questions of representativeness. 
•	 Official	data,	where	current	and	available,	to	identify	
current patterns, trends and types of migration. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently 
reviewed these official sources in Southern Africa and 
concludes that there are “huge gaps” in the data avail-
able for the construction of a regional migration picture.2 
There is currently no facility in Southern Africa for the 
central collection and analysis of migration data at the 
regional level. 
•	 Bilateral	global	migration	data	sets	compiled	by	inter-
national organizations and agencies. Those used in this 
report include:
	 •	 United	 Nations	 Population	 Division	 Bilateral	 
 International Migration Stock 1990-2015
	 •	 World	 Bank	Migration	 and	 Remittances:	 Bilateral 
 Remittance Matrix 2015
	 •	 World	Bank	Remittance	Prices	Worldwide	Database
•	 Field	research	involving	key	informant	interviews	and	
consultations with stakeholders including international 
organizations and donors, national government depart-
ments, and representatives from civil society, business, 
labour and the academy.3 The fieldwork was undertaken 
by a team of four fieldworkers from Southern Hemisphere 
Consulting. Four country visits were undertaken to South 
Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Regional 
interviews were conducted face to face, telephonically 
and by email. A total of 60 interviews were conducted 
with 86 interviewees. All interviews were transcribed and 
analyzed using NVIVO software.
SAMP • 9 
 CHAPTER 3: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS: REGIONAL MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
CHAPTER 3:  
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS: 
REGIONAL MIGRATION IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
There are a number of reasons why migration should be 
considered a regional issue, challenge and opportunity in 
Southern Africa requiring a regionally co-ordinated response:
•	 Cross-border	movements	of	people	constitute	one	of	the	
major mechanisms of regional integration in Southern 
Africa (along with trade and investment). Goods and cap-
ital move relatively freely and legally across the region 
but people still face considerable barriers to movement; 
•	 Vast	differences	in	levels	of	development	and	employ-
ment opportunities across the region have led to 
extremely uneven migration flows.4 All countries both 
send and receive migrants but the balance between the 
two varies significantly. Zimbabwe was a major destina-
tion before 2000 but has since become the region’s single 
largest exporter of migrants.5
•	 Temporary,	circular	migration	is	the	norm	in	the	region	
with migrants retaining close ties with home countries 
and communities through formal and informal transfers 
of cash and goods in the form of remittances. In effect, 
migration and remittances have become a major source 
of development finance across the region. 
•	 The	majority	of	migration	movements	within	and	to	the	
Southern African region fall into the category of South-
South migration. This form of migration, from one 
developing country to another, can have positive and 
simultaneous development and inclusive growth impacts 
on both countries of origin and destination.
•	 From	a	migration	management	perspective,	 regional	
organizations have recognized the importance of regional 
harmonization and co-ordinated action. However, gov-
ernments have been slower to recognize the reality of 
regional migration, leading to a disjuncture between 
initiatives to facilitate movement and co-ordinate at 
the continental and regional level, and national govern-
ments that wish to avoid any binding commitment to 
regional migration processes and instruments.
MIGRATION WITHIN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
Migration Patterns
There is a common perception that Southern Africa is experi-
encing a major increase in migration numbers. However, UN 
migrant stock data for the region calls this into question. The 
total number of migrants in the SADC has remained rela-
tively stable since 1990 at around 4.5 million people (Table 
1). There have certainly been shifts within the region, with 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 % Change 1990-2015
Angola 33,517 39,813 46,108 61,329 76,549 106,845 +218%
Botswana 27,510 40,168 57,064 88,829 120,912 160,644 +484%
DRC 129,527 191,635 305,002 315,238 419,649 392,996 +203%
Lesotho 8,240 7,240 6,167 6,290 6,414 6,572 -20%
Madagascar 23,917 21,177 23,451 26,058 28,905 32,075 +34%
Mauritius 3,613 7,493 15,543 19,647 24,836 28,585 +691%
Malawi 1,127,724 241,624 232,620 221,661 217,722 215,158 -618%
Mozambique 122,332 168,256 195,702 204,830 214,612 222,928 -81%
Namibia 120,641 115,372 134,403 106,274 102,405 93,888 +82%
Seychelles 3,721 5,148 6,574 8,997 11,420 12,791 +244%
South Africa 1,163,883 1,003,807 1,001,825 1,210,936 1,943,009 2,309,0446 +98%
Swaziland 72,085 25,031 22,855 27,097 30,476 31,579 -56%
Tanzania 574,025 1,106,043 928,180 770,846 308,600 261,222 -54%
Zambia 279,029 244,338 321,167 252,749 149,637 127,915 -54%
Zimbabwe 626,821 431,226 410,041 392,693 397,891 398,866 -36%
Total 4,316,585 3,648,471 3,706,702 3,713,474 4,053,037 4,401,018 +2%
Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 10, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
TABLE 1: TOTAL MIGRANT STOCK OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1990-2015
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seven countries now hosting fewer migrants than they did 
in 1990 and seven hosting more. The greatest proportional 
increases in migrant stock have been in Botswana, Angola, 
Mauritius, the Seychelles, the DRC and South Africa. The 
greatest absolute increase has been in South Africa from 1.1 
million to 2.3 million people. South Africa has become the 
major	migration	destination,	from	29%	of	all	migrants	in	the	
region	in	1990	to	52%	in	2015.	
A second common perception is that the countries of South-
ern Africa are either migrant origin or migrant destination 
countries. In fact, all of the states of Southern Africa both 
send and receive migrants (Table 2). However, only three 
countries (Botswana, South Africa and Tanzania) receive 
more migrants than they send. With the exception of the 
three island states, every country has at least some migrants 
from every other country in the region. In addition, migrants 
from one country do not go to only one other country: 
Mozambicans and South Africans are the most dispersed 
(living in 10 other countries), followed by Congolese and 
Zambians (nine other countries), Malawians and Zimbabwe-
ans (eight other countries), and the rest in six or seven other 
countries. Notably, given the common perception that South 
Africa is only a destination country, there are 107,000 South 
Africans in other countries in the region. In practice, this 
means that all countries should have a vested interest in 
addressing both inward and outward migration. 
Contract Mine Migration
Historically, the major form of labour migration in South-
ern Africa has been legal contract migration to the South 
African and Zimbabwean gold and coal mines, the Zambian 
and DRC copper mines, and the Swaziland asbestos mine. 
The South African gold and platinum mines continue to 
employ migrants from other countries, particularly Lesotho, 
Mozambique and Swaziland. However, mine closures and 
retrenchments, employment levels in the mining industry 
have been falling for two decades. Between 1987 and 2010, 
the number of mineworkers fell from 477,000 to 215,000. 
No new migrant mineworkers have been hired from outside 
South Africa since 2003. The proportion of the mine work-
force	from	outside	South	Africa	fell	from	60%	in	2003	to	only	
23%	in	2013.	The	Employment	Bureau	of	Africa	(TEBA)	esti-
mates that by 2023 there will be no foreign migrants on the 
South African mines, thus bringing to an end the contract 
labour system that began in the 1890s.7 One of the major 
consequences of the phasing out of contract migration has 
been an increase in unregulated migration. With households 
and communities no longer able to depend on mine jobs 
and mine remittances, people migrate informally to work 
in other sectors, including commercial agriculture, domestic 
work, construction, the informal sector and illicit mining.
The decline of migrant mineworkers from neighbouring 
countries has led to:
•	 A	decline	in	remittance	flows	to	these	areas	from	the	
mines; 
•	 New	forms	of	migration	among	 former	mineworkers	
including their participation in dangerous but lucrative 
illicit mining in abandoned mines; and
•	 Internal	and	informal	cross-border	migration	by	young	
workseekers, including increasing numbers of women, 
from these areas in search of non-mine employment. 
As Origin As Destination Net Migration
Mozambique 616,945 135,586 -481,359
Zimbabwe 602,844 249,789 -353,055
Lesotho 362,000 3,040 -358,960
Malawi 280,077 153,189 -126,888
Angola 271,838 51,981 -219,857
DRC 195,946 185,205 -10,741
Zambia 164,033 75,683 -88,350
Namibia 138,353 63,206 -75,147
South Africa 107,029 1,803,163 +1,696,134
Swaziland 92,232 23,450 -68,782
Botswana 51,832 105,998 +54,166
Tanzania 35,891 92,782 +56,891
Madagascar 4,182 n/a n/a
Mauritius 11,856 3,023 +8,833
Seychelles 1,530 1,614 -84
Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 10, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
 
TABLE 2: SADC MIGRANTS IN OTHER SADC COUNTRIES, 2015
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The economic challenges include rising unemployment 
and the creation of alternative job opportunities for young 
workseekers. There is little evidence that the supplier govern-
ments have seriously addressed these challenges. In Lesotho, 
this may be because the growth of the textile industry has 
ameliorated the overall impact by providing employment to 
over 50,000 women. 
Refugee Migration 
The number of forced migrants within Southern Africa 
peaked at 1.8 million in 1992. The numbers have declined 
in the last 20 years to their present level of 142,000 (mostly 
from	the	DRC)	(Figure	1).	Less	than	10%	of	the	region’s	total	
migrant stock therefore comprises refugees from within the 
region. The number of refugees from crisis states in Africa 
outside the region has also declined, peaking in the late 
1990s at around 700,000 and declining to less than 100,000 
in 2012 (Figure 2). Most countries have seen a decline in 
their refugee population although South Africa’s has slowly 
increased over the last decade to its current level (2015) of 
110,000 (mainly from African countries such as Somalia, 
Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region).
Governments are known to cite asylum-seeker figures to 
build a case that they are being inundated by refugees. The 
South African government has often claimed that it has over 
1 million asylum-seekers in the country.8 A corrective to this 
misinformation in South Africa’s new Green Paper clarifies 
that this actually refers to the cumulative number of asy-
lum applications received over time and that the number 
of currently active applications for asylum is only 78,000.9 
The number of new asylum-seekers did increase dramati-
cally after 2000, peaking in South Africa at 222,000 in 2009 
(Table 3). Since 2012, the number of asylum-seekers has been 
around 60,000-70,000 per annum. The main countries of 
origin in 2015 were Zimbabwe (10,854), Ethiopia (9,322), 
Nigeria (6,554), DRC (6,355), Bangladesh (3,290), Pakistan 
(2,448), Malawi (2,372), India (1,728), Somalia (1,582) and 
Ghana (1,778).10 
For the past decade, asylum-seeking has been dominated by 
migrants	from	Zimbabwe,	with	as	many	as	80%	of	asylum-
seekers	in	2011,	and	44%	overall	between	2002	and	2015.	
There is disagreement over how many asylum-seekers are 
refugees and how many are economic migrants. The South 
African	government	has	claimed	that	90%	are	economic	
migrants, while some researchers put the figure at only 
50%.11 
On	the	basis	of	the	90%	claim,	South	Africa’s	new	Green	
Paper proposes a controversial overhaul of the refugee pro-
tection system which would make it far more difficult for 
migrants to claim asylum, remove their right to pursue an 
economic livelihood, and confine asylum-seekers to “recep-
tion centres” until their cases are adjudicated. 
Source: UNHCR Population Statistics. Data retrieved on 12 June 2016 from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series
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FIGURE 1: TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA FROM OTHER SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1970-2014
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FIGURE 2: TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA FROM OUTSIDE SOUTHERN 
AFRICA, 1985-2014
Source: UNHCR Population Statistics. Data retrieved on 12 June 2016 from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series
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TABLE 3: ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2002-2015
Year Total Zimbabweans % Zimbabwean 
2002 55,426 115 0.2
2003 35,920 2,588 7.2
2004 32,565 5,789 17.8
2005 28,522 7,783 27.3
2006 53,361 18,973 35.6
2007 45,637 17,667 38.7
2008 207,206 111,968 54.0
2009 222,324 149,453 67.2
2010 180,637 146,566 81.1
2011 106,904 51,031 47.7
2012 117,187 20,842 17.8
2013 79,325 16,670 21.0
2014 84,174 20,405 24.2
2015 76,110 17,785 23.4
Total 1,325,298 587,635 44.3
Source: Source: UNHCR Population Statistics. Data retrieved on 15 July 2016 from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series
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Increased Intra-Regional Mobility
Greater regional integration has led to a dramatic increase in 
short-term cross-border movement within Southern Africa 
in the past two decades and this is likely to continue. Most 
border-crossers are issued with visitor, tourist or business 
permits at the point of entry. Some countries issue short-
term multiple-entry “border passes” and some permits allow 
multiple entry. The most important reasons for temporary 
movement include: (a) cross-border shopping; (b) informal 
cross-border informal trade (ICBT) where goods are pur-
chased in one country for sale in the home country; (c) 
formal business; (d) tourism; (e) visiting friends and relatives; 
and (e) medical migration. While short-term border cross-
ing for these purposes is not generally classified as a form of 
migration, this conclusion needs to be qualified in Southern 
Africa. First, transactional data on border-crossing includes 
many migrants who use visitor and other permits to enter 
legally into another country. Second, certain categories, 
such as informal traders, can be viewed as circular migrants 
because they move with great frequency and may cumu-
latively be away from their home country for an extended 
period during the year.
Mixed Migration
The term mixed migration is increasingly used by the IOM, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and governments to suggest that forced (refugee) migrants 
and economic (“illegal” or “irregular”) migrants use the 
same migration corridors and are indistinguishable from 
one another. To define mixed migration in this dualistic 
way fails to capture the complexity of migrant movements 
in Southern Africa. A more appropriate and inclusive defini-
tion should move beyond the legal status of migrants, as 
defined by states, to consider all aspects of the migration 
process.12 Migration streams from one country to another 
within Southern Africa are increasingly heterogeneous, 
encompassing diverse motives and reasons for migration, 
different forms of cross-border movement, various legal and 
extra-legal categories and diverse migrant characteristics. 
However, the major change in migration patterns in the 
past 20 years has been a significant increase in cross-border 
movement for livelihood reasons. 
This is particularly evident in the case of migration from 
Zimbabwe, which has seen an upsurge in migrants of all ages 
and skills levels.13 Although some migration is long-term 
or permanent, most is not with the intention of settling 
in the destination country. As in the past, much migration 
is circular in character with migrants retaining strong eco-
nomic and emotional ties with the home country.14
Data from the South African Census 2011 is illustrative of 
the growing heterogeneity of migrant streams:15 
•	 Other	 SADC	 countries	 are	 the	 dominant	 source	 of	
migrants	to	South	Africa	(68%)	but	there	are	increasing	
numbers of South-South migrants from the rest of Africa 
(7%)	and	from	Asia	(5%);
•	 The	migrant	population	pyramid	shows	that	only	half	of	
all	migrants	are	of	prime	working-age	(25-44)	while	12%	
are	over	the	age	of	55	and	18%	are	youth	aged	15-24.	
The migration of unaccompanied minors and increased 
family	migration	accounts	for	the	9%	of	migrant	children	
under the age of 14; 
•	 Income	levels	vary	significantly	with	roughly	half	of	all	
migrants	in	the	lowest	two	income	quintiles,	34%	in	the	
middle-income	quintile	and	14%	in	the	upper	quintiles;	
and
•	 The	educational	levels	of	migrants	varies	considerably.	
Over	60%	of	migrants	from	other	SADC	countries	have	
only some secondary school education or less (Fig-
ure	3).	Around	30%	have	completed	secondary	school	
with	10%	having	post-secondary	qualifications.	Over	
50%	of	migrants	from	the	rest	of	Africa	have	completed	
secondary	school	with	25%	holding	a	post-secondary	
qualification. 
Informal Migration 
Informal migration (sometimes called irregular or undocu-
mented migration) occurs primarily because most Southern 
African countries do not provide work permits to semi-skilled 
and low-skilled migrants from other countries. This has the 
potential to change if the proposals in the new South African 
Green Paper are implemented. Migration in Southern Africa 
has become increasingly informal and unregulated, with a 
growing proportion of economic migrants moving across 
borders and adopting a wide variety of practices to legalize 
their movement or to manipulate existing systems of control 
and enforcement. These include:
•	 Entering	another	country	legally	on	visitor’s	permits	and	
then finding work, either letting the permit expire or 
returning home regularly to renew the permit; 
•	 Entering	into	informal	agreements	with	employers	and	
labour brokers to bring them into a country to work for 
a set period and then return home;
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•	 Obtaining	an	asylum-seeker	permit	on	arrival	which	
legalizes stay in another country and can, in cases includ-
ing South Africa, entitle the holder to work; 
•	 Clandestine	border-crossing	without	proper	documenta-
tion, a strategy that is used mostly by those who cannot 
afford passports but can involve significant costs in pay-
ing guides and bribes to officials; and
•	 Obtaining	false	documentation	from	individuals,	often	
state officials, willing to supply it. 
The number of migrants in each of these categories is 
unknown. One of the challenges of measurement and man-
agement is that most are temporary migrants who return 
home relatively frequently. The strength of the linkages that 
migrants maintain with the home household, community 
and country therefore directly affects whether, and to what 
extent, the benefits of migration flow across borders. The 
best evidence for strong linkages comes from household sur-
veys done by the Southern African Migration Programme 
(SAMP) in five Southern African countries, which found 
extremely regular patterns of home visits and strong links 
with countries of origin.16 Of the 4,647 migrants surveyed, 
for	example,	nearly	90%	returned	home	at	least	once	a	year,	
with	67%	returning	several	times	a	year,	and	30%	returning	
once	a	month.	Only	7%	of	migrants	were	away	from	home	
for longer than a year at a time. 
There is no co-ordinated policy response to informalized 
migration at the regional level. At the national level there 
are various policy responses:
•	 Laissez	faire	approach,	which	implicitly	recognizes	the	
advantages to employers of hiring migrants without offi-
cial work permits and/or lacks the capacity to manage 
this form of migration; 
•	 Punitive	 approach	 involving	 arrest	 and	deportation,	
which has been the dominant policy response in Bot-
swana and South Africa. South Africa has deported 2.3 
million	migrants	since	2000,	over	98%	to	other	countries	
in the Southern African region, at considerable cost to 
the state, with disruption and abuse of migrants, and 
with little discernible effect on migration flows;17 
•	 Managerial	approach,	which	seeks	to	manage	migration	
through the issue of permits to employers, such as cor-
porate permits issued to farmers in South Africa; and 
•	 Regularization	approach,	which	legalizes	the	status	of	
migrants by offering them permanent residence or tem-
porary residence and work permits. In South Africa, there 
have been immigration amnesties for 50,000 migrant 
gold miners (1995); 125,000 SADC migrants (1996); 
100,000 Mozambican ex-refugees (2000) and 275,000 
Zimbabweans (2010). Another amnesty for Lesotho 
migrants in South Africa is currently in progress. As many 
as 400,000 applications were expected but only 2,500 
had been received by the closing date.18 
In South Africa, regularization of the legal status of over 
500,000 migrants since the mid-1990s has meant greater 
security and improved protection from exploitation and 
deportation. However, the evidence suggests that regularized 
status is used strategically by migrants who still maintain 
FIGURE 3: EDUCATION LEVELS OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
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strong ties with home. Most other countries in the region 
tend to adopt either a punitive or laissez faire approach to 
unregulated migration. 
Occupational Profile
Regional data on the occupational profile of migrants is not 
available for the whole region. Some countries, such as Bot-
swana, South Africa and Zambia, published their data on 
the occupations of migrants at the time of the most recent 
census. 
The	2011	South	African	Census	found	that	63%	of	employed	
migrants were in the formal sector and two-thirds were from 
other	Southern	African	countries,	with	10%	from	Europe,	
7%	from	other	African	countries	and	6%	from	Asia.19 Unusu-
ally in international terms, migrants to South Africa appear 
to have a lower unemployment rate than people born in 
the	country.	Census	2011	recorded	that	63%	of	migrants	
in	South	Africa	were	employed,	17%	were	unemployed	and	
20%	were	not	economically	active.20 Data from the Quarterly 
Labour	Force	Survey	(QLFS)	 for	2012	shows	that	15%	of	
migrants	 were	 unemployed,	 compared	 to	 26%	 of	 non-
migrants	and	33%	of	internal	migrants.21 Migrants’ higher 
employment levels are accounted for in part by informal 
work and self-employment, but some South African employ-
ers also prefer hiring migrants if they are available, claiming 
they are cheaper or work harder. 
An analysis of 2008 National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) 
data compared the employment sectors of South Africans 
and migrants and found that with the exception of mining 
(with a greater relative proportion of migrants) and ser-
vices (vice-versa) there were considerable similarities (Table 
4).22 The analysis showed that migrants are also distributed 
across the labour market and not confined to one or two 
sectors. Finally, a comparison with QLFS 2012 data suggests 
a major decline in mining employment (as anticipated) and 
increase in wholesale and retail, construction and agricul-
tural employment among migrants.23 
A similar pattern of broad distribution of migrant occupa-
tions emerges in the occupational profile of the employed 
NIDS (2008) QLFS (2012)
Local (%) Migrant (%) Migrant (%)
Mining and quarrying 4 15 4
Wholesale and retail 13 14 28
Manufacturing 15 13 11
Services 23 13 13
Financial 11 11 9
Private households 9 10 12
Construction 5 6 12
Agriculture 7 4 8
Transport 4 2 3
Utilities 1 1 0
Source: Budlender (2013); Fauvelle-Aymar (2014)
TABLE 4: EMPLOYMENT SECTORS OF MIGRANTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS
NIDS (2008) QLFS 2012
Local (%) Migrant (%) Migrant (%)
Craft and related trade workers 14 33 22
Professionals 13 17 6
Low-skilled elementary 21 15 22
Clerks 11 10 4
Service and sales workers 13 9 16
Plant and machinery operators 10 8 5
Technicians and associated 5 4 7
Skilled agricultural 5 2 1
Legislators/managers/senior officials 6 1 11
Domestic workers 7
Source: Budlender (2013); Fauvelle-Aymar (2014)
TABLE 5: OCCUPATIONS OF MIGRANTS AND SOUTH AFRICANS
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migrant population with, again, several shifts between 2008 
and 2012 with a greater proportion of migrants in less-skilled 
jobs (Table 5).
Published data from the Zambian 2011 Census lists the top 
10 occupations of migrants and shows that at least a third 
were in skilled job categories (Figure 4).24 Another quarter 
were involved in agricultural production as farmers and 
workers. A more recent study has shown that Zambia is a 
popular destination for Chinese workers employed by Chi-
nese companies on major infrastructural projects.25
Migration Corridors
Unlike the migration corridors that connect the countries 
of South East Asia to the Gulf, most migrants in Southern 
Africa travel overland and generally do so independently. 
The transaction costs associated with migration therefore 
tend to be much lower in this region and the high degrees 
of migration-related indebtedness in Asia are not seen in 
Southern Africa. However, migration is not a cost-neutral 
exercise and involves transportation costs, documenta-
tion fees (passports and visas), the costs of border-crossing 
(legal and clandestine) and the various financial demands 
of remaining a migrant (including fees for permit renewal, 
bribes and protection money).
Because of the prevalence of overland travel, migration 
routes tend to follow major transportation arteries. Migrants 
who live far from these arteries first make their way to the 
nearest centre on the artery where they join the flows of 
people leaving and returning. Destinations tend to be deter-
mined by where work or other economic opportunities are 
seen as most promising. Small towns and farms along a 
migration corridor are common temporary stopping points. 
Migrants moving to South Africa tend to go mainly to Gaut-
eng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. Social networks 
are exercising an increasingly strong influence on migrant 
destinations.
Major migration corridors include:
•	 Zimbabwe	(Harare)	through	Beitbridge	to	farms	in	Lim-
popo, to Gauteng (Johannesburg) and to the Western 
Cape (Cape Town); 
•	 Southern	Zimbabwe	(Bulawayo)	through	Plumtree	to	
Botswana (Francistown and Gaborone). Some onward 
migration occurs from Botswana to South Africa;
•	 Southern	Mozambique	 (rural	 and	Maputo)	 through	
Ressano Garcia to farms in Mpumalanga, to Gauteng 
(Johannesburg and Pretoria) and the gold and platinum 
mines; and
19.8
6.0
5.4
5.1
5.0
4.1
3.5
3.1
3.1
2.8
Subsistence agricultural and fishery workers
Shop salespersons and demonstrators
Stall and market salespersons
General managers
Market gardeners and crop growers
Directors and chief executives
Architects, engineers and related professionals
Health professionals (except nursing)
Agricultural, fishery and related labourers
Business professionals
M
ai
n 
oc
cu
pa
tio
n 
ca
te
go
ry
Percentage
FIGURE 4: TOP TEN MIGRANT OCCUPATIONS IN ZAMBIA
Source: Central Statistical Office (2013) 
SAMP • 17 
 CHAPTER 3: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS: REGIONAL MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
•	 Lesotho	(rural	and	Maseru)	through	Maseru	Bridge	to	
farms and mines in the Free State, farms in the Western 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal and to Bloemfontein and Gaut-
eng (Johannesburg) for domestic workers.
MIGRATION TO SOUTHERN 
AFRICA
For much of the 20th century, Southern Africa was a sig-
nificant destination for immigrants from Europe. After 
independence, most countries abandoned these colonial 
policies. Permanent immigration from Europe was also 
largely abandoned by South Africa after 1994 and it joined 
the other countries of the region in rejecting immigration 
policies as a way to attract skilled migrants. In 2014, for 
example, South Africa issued only 4,136 permanent residence 
permits	of	which	only	30%	(1,228)	were	work-related.26 Eco-
nomic migration from the rest of Africa, as well as Asia, has 
increased significantly in the last two decades. A quarter of 
all migrants in Southern Africa are now from African coun-
tries	outside	the	region	(Table	6).	A	further	2%	are	from	Asia	
but the numbers are increasing rapidly. The majority of the 
7%	of	migrants	from	Europe	are	a	legacy	from	an	earlier	era	
when the government recruited immigrants from Europe to 
add to the white population. 
The fact that one-third of migrants in the Southern African 
region are not from the region raises two pertinent ques-
tions: (a) is the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid 
acting as a disincentive for SADC countries to fully engage 
with and compete on an increasingly global market for skills? 
and (b) should the SADC be trying to build a regional policy 
that gives preference to intra-regional migrants and excludes 
migrants from other African regions or should it rather be 
co-operating with other regions to pursue and implement an 
Africa-wide agenda under AU direction? 
Most countries in Southern Africa issue temporary work 
permits to skilled migrants from inside and outside the 
region, provided that employers can demonstrate that no 
local can do the job. None operate a points system and 
most are unlikely to issue permanent immigration status. 
There is actually a major disjuncture between independent 
assessments of skills shortages and the heavily bureaucratic 
mechanisms in place in most countries to control the import 
of skills. This is particularly evident in the health sector 
where skills import is not seen as a viable solution to the 
shortage of health professionals. 
Comprehensive regional data on skills migration is cur-
rently unavailable. Data that does exist suggests that most 
skilled migrants in Southern Africa come from outside the 
region. South Africa, for example, issued 96,000 work per-
mits between 2011 and 2014. In 2014, around a quarter went 
to Zimbabweans but no other Southern African states are in 
the top 10 origin countries (Figure 5).27 The majority of Bot-
swana’s 20,000 work permit holders are from neighbouring 
Zimbabwe and South Africa (Figure 6). In the case of Zambia, 
the picture is somewhat different with the majority of work 
permits issued to migrants from China and India.28
MIGRATION FROM SOUTHERN 
AFRICA
There is a common perception that migration in Southern 
Africa largely occurs within and to the region. It is therefore 
important to emphasize that there has been significant out-
migration from Southern Africa. Although comprehensive 
data for every country is not available, there is abundant 
evidence that the region has experienced a major “brain 
drain” of skills in the past two decades and that this is 
ongoing. Recent surveys, particularly in the health sector, 
show extreme levels of dissatisfaction and a high emigration 
potential among health professionals.29 If these push factors 
TABLE 6: REGION OF ORIGIN OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 2015
No. %
Southern Africa 2,840,331 65.6
East, West and Central Africa 1,090,733 25.2
Europe 284,919 6.6
Asia 68,158 1.6
North Africa and Middle East 18,376 0.4
North America 15,982 0.3
Oceania 5,298 0.1
South America 3,950 0.1
Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 10, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
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are not addressed by governments, the drain of skills from 
the region is very likely to continue. 
The movement of migrants out of the region is so volumi-
nous	that	53%	(or	6.0	million	people)	of	the	total	number	
of Southern African migrants are outside the region (Table 
7). This means that there are more Southern African migrants 
outside	than	inside	the	region,	with	1.2	million	(21%)	in	
Europe,	1.1	million	(19%)	in	East	and	Central	Africa,	374,000	
(6%)	in	North	America	and	309,000	(5%)	in	Oceania.	This	
has considerable implications for migration and develop-
ment policies which align with global and African advocacy 
of the role of diasporas in African development. 
With the exception of the BLS states (Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland) and Namibia, all of the SADC countries have 
sizable diasporas outside the continent. The South African 
diaspora is the largest (at 730,000), followed by Zimbabwe 
(380,000), Angola (238,000), the DRC (211,000), Mauri-
tius (151,000), Madagascar (134,000), Tanzania (121,000), 
Mozambique (85,000) and Zambia (74,000). This suggests 
that most Southern African countries have an interest in 
diaspora engagement for development. In terms of the 
geographical spread of the SADC diaspora, the greatest con-
centration is in the UK, followed by Australia, France, the 
US, Portugal, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands and 
Germany.
The major diaspora migration corridors are South Africa to 
the UK and Australia, followed by Angola to Portugal, Zim-
babwe to the UK, Madagascar to France and South Africa to 
the US. In total, there are 10 bilateral diaspora corridors with 
more than 45,000 migrants from Southern Africa, again sug-
gesting that a broader regional diaspora migration policy or 
set of policies would be a productive way forward.
FIGURE 7: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF WORK PERMIT HOLDERS IN ZAMBIA, 2009-2012
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2009 2010 2011 2012
No. %
Southern Africa 2,840,331 47.0
Europe 1,240,557 20.5
Rest of Africa 1,172,778 19.4
North America 374,295 6.2
Oceania 308,706 5.1
South America 69,201 1.1
North Africa and Middle East 15,600 0.3
Asia 10,573 0.2
West Africa 8,992 0.1
6,041,033 100.0
TABLE 7: DESTINATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRANTS, 2015
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HARNESSING MIGRATION FOR 
DEVELOPMENT
There is a large and varied international literature on the 
subject of harnessing migration for development and 
inclusive growth. Many of these possible areas of interven-
tion have been debated at length in international forums 
such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development 
(GFMD).30 Rather than providing a comprehensive overview 
of all aspects of the migration and development nexus, here 
we focus only on those that provide particularly promis-
ing opportunities for programming in Southern Africa. The 
information and discussion that follows provides a back-
ground to the recommendations in Section 5.
Gender and Migration
Southern Africa is generally seen as a region undergoing rapid 
feminization of migration with female migrants increasing 
in numbers and as a proportion of the total.31 Migrant stock 
data confirms the first observation but not the second (Table 
10). Between 1990 and 2015, the number of female migrants 
in the SADC increased by several hundred thousand to 2.25 
million. However, the proportion of female migrants actually 
declined	over	the	same	period	from	46%	to	43%	of	the	total	
and	the	proportion	of	male	migrants	increased	from	54%	to	
57%.	In	the	major	destination	country	(South	Africa),	the	
proportion of female migrants increased marginally from 
38%	to	40%	but	migration	remained	male-dominated	(with	
60%	of	the	migrant	stock	being	male).	In	1990,	there	were	
more male than female migrants in 11 SADC countries; in 
Diaspora Origins No. Diaspora Locations No.
South Africa 731,416 United Kingdom 540,915
Zimbabwe 379,448 Australia 275,774
Angola 237,947 France 271,896
DRC 211,060 United States 242,340
Mauritius 151,340 Portugal 233,904
Madagascar 133,807 Canada 132,553
Tanzania 121,466 New Zealand 66,283
Mozambique 85,023 Netherlands 30,071
Zambia 73,817 Germany 29,612
Malawi 21,634
Seychelles 10,219
Namibia 7,133
Botswana 6,514
Swaziland 3,440
Lesotho 1,569
TABLE 8: DIASPORA ORIGINS AND LOCATIONS, 2015
TABLE 9: MAJOR DIASPORA CORRIDORS, 2015
Diaspora Corridor No.
South Africa-UK 218,732
South Africa-Australia 183,370
Angola-Portugal 151,273
Zimbabwe-UK 132,942
Madagascar-France 120,400
South Africa-US 88,907
DRC-France 76,723
Mozambique-Portugal 67,991
Zimbabwe-US 50,001
South Africa-Canada 47,182
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2015, the number was still 10 (with only Angola having 
shifted).
A second critical component of the feminization of migra-
tion is increased independent migration by women of all 
ages, educational backgrounds and skills levels. Unfortu-
nately, with existing gender-neutral data sets, it is difficult to 
amplify this point. For example, South Africa’s Department 
of Home Affairs releases data on the number of permanent 
and temporary residence permits granted each year, but this 
provides only country of origin and age breakdowns and not 
the sex of permit-holders. Given the employment, capital, 
education and skills criteria for most of the official residence 
and work permit categories in South Africa, we can reason-
ably assume a male bias in determining eligibility, meaning 
a likely male majority in legal residence and work-permit-
holders. For obvious reasons, no accurate count or gender 
breakdown is available for informal migrants, who make 
up a significant but unknown proportion of total migrant 
numbers. There seems to be a persistent pattern of male 
domination in current refugee and asylum-seeker flows. In 
2015,	males	represented	67%	of	the	country’s	asylum	claim-
ants,	females	33%.
There is limited gender-based data or analysis of migrant 
labour and employment, but the South African indications 
are that migrant women are more likely to be unemployed 
than migrant men. Data from the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey for the third quarter of 2012 suggests that a migrant 
woman	had	only	a	56%	probability	of	being	employed	com-
pared to a migrant man.32 This requires further multivariate 
analysis by country of origin, migration category, date of 
arrival and geographical location for meaningful explanation 
beyond general gender discrimination. 
Migrant Rights and Protections
Legal temporary work programmes are advocated inter-
nationally as a “triple development win” for countries of 
origin, countries of destination and migrants themselves.33 
Some countries, such as South Africa, have implemented 
bilateral temporary work programmes with other developing 
countries such as Cuba, Tunisia and India to import skilled 
migrants, especially in the health sector.34 Mauritius has 
imported temporary workers from Bangladesh, India and 
China to work in construction and manufacturing.35 Various 
countries have facilitated the temporary import of Chinese 
workers as part of major China-funded construction pro-
jects.36 With the major exception of Mauritius, few Southern 
African countries have taken advantage of the opportuni-
ties created by temporary work programmes in the North.37 
These various bilateral temporary work initiatives, involving 
connections with other parts of the world, have not been 
systematically evaluated from the perspective of their posi-
tive or negative development impacts.
1990 2015
Female Male Female Male
Angola 46 54 52 48
Botswana 40 60 45 55
DRC 50 50 45 55
Lesotho 48 52 46 54
Madagascar 44 56 43 57
Malawi 52 48 52 48
Mauritius 51 49 45 55
Mozambique 46 54 52 48
Namibia 47 53 46 54
Seychelles 41 59 30 70
South Africa 38 62 40 60
Swaziland 46 54 48 52
Tanzania 51 49 50 50
Zambia 49 51 50 50
Zimbabwe 44 56 43 57
Total 46 54 43 57
Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 25, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
TABLE 10: PROPORTION OF MALE AND FEMALE MIGRANTS
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Within Southern Africa, the only significant temporary work 
programme (now in decline) is the contract labour system 
to the South African mines. Prior to 2002, the mining com-
panies could recruit and employ as many foreign miners as 
they wished. This changed in 2002 with South Africa’s new 
Immigration Act which obliged the mines to apply for new 
corporate permits to employ foreign migrants. This system 
proved cumbersome and the mines stopped employing new 
migrants from outside the country. Commercial farmers are 
thought to have been major users of the corporate permit 
system to legalize their employment of migrants but there 
is no information available on the corporate permit system. 
There is a growing body of case-study evidence on infor-
mal temporary migration and the low wage regime and 
exploitative conditions in sectors such as construction, illicit 
mining, commercial agriculture and domestic work. For 
those migrant women who are employed, many are engaged 
in precarious livelihoods. Some are employed in potentially 
exploitative conditions with weak oversight or protection 
of their labour rights, for example as domestic workers38 or 
farm workers.39 Others are engaged in inherently precari-
ous informal occupations such as trading, hair braiding and 
other beauty services, or craft production and sales, often 
conducted in unsafe spaces.40 Related to their precarious 
working and living conditions, female migrants experience 
gender-based violence and other health vulnerabilities. This 
is particularly acute for those who engage in sex work: a 2010 
survey of female sex workers in Johannesburg, Rustenburg 
and	Cape	Town	found	that	46%	were	migrants.41 
Women and girls tend to be concentrated in the commercial, 
agriculture and domestic work sectors. It is clear that the 
poor treatment of regional migrants on the way to and at the 
workplace has an extremely negative impact on the migrants 
themselves and their households, but this is also antithetical 
to development and inclusive growth in their home coun-
tries. For example, low wages and other forms of financial 
extortion severely reduce the remitting ability of migrants. 
Employers of domestic and agricultural workers have been 
found to deny migrants their basic labour rights, engage in 
exploitative labour practices such as low pay, withholding 
wages, excessively long hours, poor accommodation and 
dangerous working conditions. Poor conditions and abuse at 
the workplace go unpunished when reporting to the authori-
ties is likely to lead to arrest as an “illegal foreigner”, job loss 
and deportation. Precarious employment in the agricultural 
and domestic service sectors is highly gendered with female 
migrants being most vulnerable to exploitation by formal 
and informal labour brokers and recruiters, employers and 
the police. 
The potentially highly exploitative institutional mecha-
nisms, both formal and informal, that connect employers to 
source areas for migrants are largely unknown and unregu-
lated. As Kiwanuka et al conclude, “much more research is 
needed on the informal aspects of [women’s] labour migra-
tion, which point to the presence of multiple dynamics and 
actors including locally based transnational networks of 
recruitment and migration, informal agencies and aspects 
of indebtedness.”42 Female migrant workers in commercial 
agriculture and domestic service face “nearly impossible bar-
riers in accessing a legal right to work.” This means that 
their legal situation is precarious and they are constantly 
vulnerable to arrest and deportation and to exploitation 
by employers that they are powerless to report and seek 
redress. The treatment of migrants travelling to and from 
places of work is largely unaddressed at a regional level (not 
just in South Africa), although the negative experiences of 
girl migrants in three countries have been identified by Save 
the Children.43 
One of the major challenges confronting migrants is access 
to formal social protection programmes in countries of des-
tination and, to a lesser degree, the portability of eligible 
social benefits across borders. Olivier has argued that “the 
constitutional and fundamental rights protection informing 
the social security position of intra-SADC migrants is weak 
and unsatisfactory.”44 Another study has highlighted the 
absence of good nationally representative data on migrant 
social protection and portability.45 Much recent attention 
has been focused on the question of the portability of rights 
for migrant miners. Given the imminent demise of foreign 
migrant labour on the mines, however, the social protection 
challenge relates more to redressing the negative legacies 
of the system. Two legacies of mine migration are being 
addressed by various stakeholders:
•	 Unpaid	social	security	benefits	in	the	form	of	provident	
and pension funds amounting to over ZAR4.0 billion 
owed to at least 200,000 ex-mineworkers;46 and 
•	 The	human	and	financial	cost	of	the	health	burden	on	
neighbouring countries from occupational disease.47 
In May 2016, the South African High Court allowed a 
class-action lawsuit against over 25 mining companies, 
which could eventually benefit as many as 300,000 ex-
mineworkers with silicosis.48 
Social security entitlements and compensation and the 
settlement of lawsuits could see significant sums being trans-
ferred from South Africa to impoverished ex-mineworkers 
and their families (Table 11).
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Migration and Remittances
There is a considerable body of case-study research evidence 
to confirm that remitting is an extremely common practice 
in Southern Africa. However, much remitting is through 
informal channels, and accurate data on remittance flows 
at the regional level is not available. FinMark Trust observes 
that the “deficit of complete and high quality data” has made 
it difficult to formulate a comprehensive policy response.49
There are two main sources of data on overall cash remit-
tance flows: (a) World Bank calculations and (b) FinMark 
Trust estimates. In this report, we relied on World Bank data, 
which provides a more comprehensive picture of bilateral 
flows across the region (Table 12):
•	 There	has	been	a	consistent	increase	in	total	global	remit-
tance flows to the countries of Southern Africa from 
USD200 million in 1995 to USD1 billion in 2014; 
•	 The	major	remittance-sending	countries	in	2014	were	
South Africa (at USD639 million), Zimbabwe (USD50 
million), Botswana (USD48 million), and Malawi and 
Mozambique (at USD31 million each); 
•	 The	major	recipients	were	Zimbabwe	(no	data),	Leso-
tho (USD426 million), Mozambique (USD128 million), 
Botswana (USD41 million), Tanzania (USD40 million), 
Zambia (USD37 million), Malawi (USD30 million) and 
Swaziland (USD23 million); 
•	 The	main	remittance	corridors	are	South	Africa-Zimba-
bwe (no data), South Africa-Lesotho (USD414 million), 
South Africa-Mozambique (USD90 million), South Africa-
Botswana (USD38 million) and Botswana-South Africa 
(USD33 million);
•	 Significantly,	only	a	third	(31%)	of	remittances	to	South-
ern African countries come from other countries within 
the	 region.	Over	 two-thirds	 (69%)	 of	 remittances	 to	
Social Security Institution Amount No. of Beneficiaries
Mineworkers Provident Fund ZAR3,008,289,913 106,149
Living Hands Umbrella Trust ZAR1,200,000,000 12,500
Mines 1970s Pension & Provident Funds ZAR200,000,000 59,702
Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund ZAR101,000,000 Unknown
Compensation Commissioner for  
Occupational Diseases
18,000 (claims backlog) 
274,000 (still to be compensated)
Compensation Fund 12,000 (still to be compensated)
TABLE 11: SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS OWED TO EX-MINEWORKERS
TABLE 12: REMITTANCE FLOWS WITHIN AND TO SOUTHERN AFRICA (USD MILLION)
Total remittances 
sent
Total remittances 
received
Intra-regional 
remittances 
received
Extra-regional 
remittances 
received
Regional as per-
centage of total
Angola 6 11 5 6 45.4
Botswana 48 45 41 4 91.1
DRC 3 22 3 19 13.6
Lesotho 1 430 426 4 99.1
Madagascar 0 427 8 419 18.7
Malawi 35 38 30 8 78.9
Mauritius 1 249 15 235 6.0
Mozambique 35 161 128 33 79.5
Namibia 9 10 9 1 90.0
Seychelles 3 17 1 16 5.9
South Africa 639 866 91 775 10.5
Swaziland 12 24 23 1 95.8
Tanzania 15 389 40 349 10.3
Zambia 4 58 37 21 63.8
Zimbabwe 50 – – – n/a
Regional total 861 2,747 857 1,890 31.2
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data
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Southern African countries therefore come from outside 
the region; and 
•	 There	are	differences	among	countries	in	the	proportion	
of remittances received from other countries in Southern 
Africa versus the proportion that comes from outside the 
region.	In	some	countries,	over	90%	of	remittances	are	
intra-regional (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swazi-
land).	In	others,	more	than	80%	of	remittances	come	
from outside the region (DRC, Seychelles, Mauritius, 
South Africa and Tanzania).
For purposes of harnessing remittances for development and 
inclusive growth, both sources of remittances need to be 
tapped. 
Table 13 refers only to remittances through formal chan-
nels. It is well documented that the majority of migrants 
within the Southern African region use informal channels 
including personal conveyance. In some cases, especially 
Zimbabwe, there are specialist transporters of remittances 
who run small businesses in this sector. While increased 
use of formal channels is a desirable objective of banks and 
money transfer companies, and a fundamental aim of the 
World Bank, it needs to be established whether migrants use 
informal channels out of choice or necessity and what the 
impacts of formalization would be on informal operators, 
many of whom are themselves migrants.
One reason migrants may avoid formal channels is the cost 
of remitting in Southern Africa, among the highest globally. 
The	global	average	cost	of	sending	remittances	was	7.5%	of	
the amount received. In South Africa, the average was more 
than	double	the	global	average	at	15.2%.	Considerable	work	
in reducing remittance costs has been done by FinMark Trust 
in trying to resolve what it calls the “problem of informalisa-
tion”; that is, the preference of remitters to utilize informal 
channels and the exclusionary practices of financial institu-
tions.50 Significant changes in the regulatory environment 
and technological advances now provide platforms for more 
efficient and cost-effective money transfer services, which 
may prompt a shift towards greater formalization and finan-
cial inclusion.51 
In much of the discussion about remittances and develop-
ment, the fact that migrants remit goods as well as cash is 
ignored. However, research suggests that this is an important 
aspect of remitting in Southern Africa. Just over one-third 
of the households in a five-country SAMP survey had also 
received goods in the previous year (Table 13).52 Here again, 
there was considerable variation from country to country. 
Goods remittances were most important to households in 
Zimbabwe	(68%)	and	Mozambique	(65%)	and	least	impor-
tant	to	households	in	Lesotho	(20%)	and	Swaziland	(17%).	
Although the average annual value of cash remittances was 
about three times as much as goods remittances, in Mozam-
bique they were almost the same and in Zimbabwe only 
twice as much. These figures suggest that goods remitting is 
a significant component of remitting in Southern Africa that 
needs more attention. 
Globally, female migrants send approximately the same per 
capita amount of remittances as male migrants. Women tend 
to send a higher proportion of their income, even though 
they generally earn less than men.53 They also usually send 
money more regularly and for longer periods of time. By 
sending smaller sums more often, women also tend to 
spend more on transfer fees. While men mostly remit to 
their partners, women often send remittances to the per-
son (often another woman) taking care of her children to 
ensure that the money is spent on the children. Research by 
SAMP showed that many of these general patterns prevailed 
in Southern Africa with distinct gender differences in remit-
ting amounts, frequency and means of remitting, remittance 
recipients and use of remittances. This evidence suggests that 
data, research and policy-making on migration needs to be 
gender-disaggregated. 
Migration and Informal 
Entrepreneurship
The numbers of migrants running small and micro-enter-
prises or being employed in these businesses is considerable 
in towns and cities across the region. In South Africa, as 
many as one-third of migrants are self-employed in the 
informal economy. The Gauteng City-Region Observatory 
International migrants Internal migrants
% receiving cash remittances 68 44
% receiving goods remittances 36 19
Mean cash remittances ZAR4,821 ZAR5,434
Mean value of goods remittances ZAR1,702 ZAR2,004
Importance to survival (%) 88 85
Source: SAMP
TABLE 13: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL GOODS REMITTING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 2008
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(GCRO)	Quality	of	Life	 Survey	2013	 found	 that	11%	of	
Johannesburg	residents	owned	their	own	business	and	65%	
of all business owners operated in the informal economy. 
Around	20%	of	 informal	business	owners	were	migrants	
from another country.54 The ILO definition of the informal 
economy encompasses precarious employment including 
those who are employed and self-employed in the informal 
sector and also those who are working unpaid in a house-
hold business and working in a job that does not entitle 
them to employment benefits. Under this definition, the 
proportion of migrants working in the informal economy 
rises	to	53%	in	South	Africa.55 Recent case studies in South 
African cities provide various insights into the nature of 
informal self-employment. 
Recent surveys of over 1,000 informal business owners in 
Cape Town and Johannesburg (Table 9) showed that: 
•	 In	both	cities,	30%	of	those	running	informal	enterprises	
were women; 
•	 Many	entrepreneurs	were	young	(virtually	all	under	the	
age	of	50	and	70-80%	under	the	age	of	40);	
•	 Informal	migrant	entrepreneurs	come	from	a	wide	variety	
of countries inside and outside Southern Africa. The pat-
tern was slightly different in the two cities: Zimbabweans 
predominated in both but Somalis and Ethiopians were 
more	common	in	Cape	Town	than	Johannesburg	(23%	
versus	10%).	On	the	other	hand,	entrepreneurs	 from	
Mozambique and Lesotho were more common in Johan-
nesburg	(19%	versus	2%);	
•	 The	occupational	distribution	was	similar	in	both	cities	
with	trade	dominant	in	both	(at	around	60%);	and
•	 The	vast	majority	in	both	cities	had	a	legal	right	to	be	in	
the	country	with	only	about	10%	undocumented.56 
Informal business owners are classified as self-employed but 
they also have positive development impacts in countries 
of destination and origin through (a) remittance of busi-
ness profits to home countries; (b) generating employment 
in countries of destination for migrants and citizens. In 
Cape	Town,	for	example,	30%	of	migrant-owned	businesses	
employ	other	migrants	while	41%	employ	South	Africans;57 
(c) rental of business properties from local property owners; 
(d) providing cheaper services, including food, and credit 
to poor consumers in countries of operation; (e) support-
ing formal sector businesses and employment generation 
through purchase of products for resale from wholesalers and 
retailers; (f) payment of operating licences to municipalities; 
and (g) paying VAT on purchased goods.
The major challenges to business survival and expansion 
include (a) difficulties of securing start-up capital and con-
sequent reliance on personal savings; (b) problems securing 
business loans from formal financial institutions, especially 
banks; (c) lack of basic business training and skills; (d) exclu-
sion from the formal banking system and business banking, 
thus increasing vulnerability to crime; (e) direct competition 
from formal businesses especially supermarkets; (f) vulner-
ability to xenophobic attacks and destruction of stock and 
business premises; and (g) a hostile operating environment 
including official harassment, extortion and demands for 
bribes or protection money.
Diasporas for Development
As noted above, all of the countries of Southern Africa have 
sizable diasporas living outside the country. The African 
Union and many individual countries increasingly recognize 
the diaspora as an important actual and potential develop-
ment resource for remittances, investments, philanthropy, 
tourism, training and skills transfer. While the SADC Secre-
tariat has not articulated a policy for diaspora engagement 
at the regional level, many individual governments are 
developing plans and policies for diaspora engagement. An 
important information gap concerns the attitudes of dias-
poras themselves to engagement in development-related 
activities and initiatives in their countries of origin. There 
are four key questions: (a) what kinds of backward linkages, 
if any, do migrants maintain with their countries of origin? 
(b) what interest do they have in leveraging these linkages 
for development purposes? (c) what kinds of development-
related activities are diasporas interested in and capable of 
initiating and supporting? and (d) are they prepared to work 
with governments and respond to government diaspora 
engagement policies or do they prefer to work outside gov-
ernment channels, for example with the private and NGO 
sectors?
Answers to these questions can only be gathered from 
research with diasporas. Two studies provide some insights 
for particular diasporas. The first is a study of the global 
Zambian diaspora undertaken by the IOM and the Diaspora 
Liaison Office of the Zambian Government in 2008 and 
updated in 2014.58 The 2014 iteration reports the findings 
from 1,200 respondents:
•	 The	primary	reasons	for	leaving	Zambia	were	employ-
ment/business	opportunities	(42%)	and	education	(38%);
•	 As	many	as	70%	left	Zambia	more	than	five	years	ago,	
40%	having	been	away	for	more	than	10	years.	Nearly	
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50%	return	to	Zambia	at	least	once	per	year.	Only	9%	
have never returned since leaving;
•	 Around	two-thirds	(69%)	intend	to	return	to	Zambia	per-
manently	while	another	25%	are	unsure;
•	 The	diaspora	is	highly	skilled	with	around	70%	having	
graduate	 degrees	 (including	 40%	with	 post-graduate	
degrees)	and	another	20%	with	college	qualifications;
•	 Over	 80%	 send	 remittances	 to	 Zambia,	 44%	 on	 a	
monthly basis. Most send remittances to financially sup-
port	family	or	friends	(94%)	and	personal	investment	
(37%).	Remittances	flow	largely	through	formal	channels	
(banks and money transfer companies); 
•	 As	many	as	91%	are	interested	in	making	private	invest-
ments in Zambia, with the greatest sectoral interest in 
agriculture/horticulture	(47%),	import	(28%),	manufac-
turing	(28%),	tourism	(26%)	and	transport	(24%);	and
•	 Nearly	60%	express	interest	in	contributing	to	or	donat-
ing	to	development	projects	in	Zambia,	with	only	11%	
uninterested. The preferred project areas include educa-
tion	(62%),	healthcare	(41%),	infrastructure	development	
(31%),	 childcare	 (26%)	 and	microfinance	 initiatives	
(23%).	Over	80%	are	interested	in	skills	transfer	and	41%	
in making financial contributions. 
The second study by SAMP surveyed 2,450 migrants from 
SADC countries who had immigrated to Canada:59 
•	 Only	19%	of	the	sample	entered	Canada	in	the	economic	
class. The bulk of the remainder entered as asylum-
seekers/refugees	(34%),	students	(18%)	and	family-class	
immigrants	(15%).	Irrespective	of	the	category	of	entry,	
53%	had	acquired	Canadian	citizenship;
•	 The	immigrants	had	attained	high	levels	of	education	
before	coming	to	Canada.	For	example,	30%	had	at	least	
a university degree upon entry. As many as a third had to 
re-certify or retrain in Canada in order to work in a field 
for which they were already trained; 
•	 The	most	common	occupations	included	sales	and	ser-
vice, health and finance, business and banking; and 
•	 Almost	two-thirds	(62%)	felt	that	they	have	an	important	
role to play in developing their countries of origin. Only 
15%	said	they	had	no	role	to	play;
•	 Nearly	70%	remit	money	to	their	country	of	origin.	One-
quarter remit at least once a month, another third at 
least once a year and the rest occasionally. The average 
amount remitted is CAD1,000 per year. Remitting largely 
consists of private funds sent to immediate and extended 
family.	Nearly	all	remitters	(95%)	send	money	to	imme-
diate	family	members,	while	10%	send	remittances	to	
community groups and organizations; 
•	 In	terms	of	diaspora	engagement	activities,	nearly	50%	
have participated in some kind of economic activity in 
their	country	of	origin:	25%	have	exported	Canadian	
goods	 for	 sale,	 11%	have	 invested	 in	 business,	 11%	
have	generated	employment,	and	10%	have	engaged	
in research partnerships. In terms of willingness to be 
engaged in the future, only nine percent said they had 
no interest; and 
•	 The	preferred	avenues	of	engagement	 included	skills	
transfer	(mentioned	by	58%),	 investing	in	businesses	
(55%),	 participation	 in	development	projects	 (52%),	
educational	exchanges	 (52%),	volunteer	work	 (48%),	
fundraising	 for	development	projects	 (46%),	 philan-
thropy	(42%),	export	and	import	of	goods	to	and	from	
the	country	of	origin	(38%),	investing	in	infrastructural	
development	 (39%)	 and	providing	distance	 learning	
(37%).	Others	specifically	mentioned	their	desire	to	be	
involved in activities that would lead to greater empow-
erment for women and children.
A related study of South African philanthropists in Canada 
found (a) that they preferred to work with non-governmen-
tal organizations in the education and health sectors; and 
(b) that some were generous givers but preferred to donate 
to Canadian causes, citing corruption and related reasons for 
not donating to South Africa.60
In sum, the research suggests that migrants from the South-
ern African region have not turned their backs on their 
countries of origin and that there is considerable latent 
potential for diaspora engagement in development-related 
activities in the region.
SAMP • 27 
 CHAPTER 4: MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT AS A REGIONAL CHALLENGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
CHAPTER 4: MIGRATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT AS A 
REGIONAL CHALLENGE IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
In principle, there is significant awareness among SADC 
member states about the need to strengthen efforts aimed at 
harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development. 
The member states of the SADC have more than a decade of 
participation in international and regional forums on migra-
tion and development (including the annual Global Forum 
on Migration and Development, the two UN High Level Dia-
logues on International Migration and the 2013 Diaspora 
Ministerial Conference) as well as the Migration Dialogue 
for Southern Africa (MIDSA) regional consultative process.61 
Many states should be cognizant of the key modalities and 
actions required to make migration work for development. 
The relationship between migration and development is also 
clearly articulated in the AU Migration Policy Framework 
and the African Common Position on Migration and Devel-
opment. On the face of it, therefore, there are reasons to 
be optimistic about a regional migration and development 
agenda co-ordinated by the SADC Secretariat and imple-
mented by member states. 
In practice, little progress has been made on mainstream-
ing migration and development at the national or regional 
policy level. Regional efforts to forge a common approach 
to migration appear promising, but while states appear 
willing to make initial commitments to agreements, instru-
ments and initiatives, they are generally unwilling to ratify 
and implement anything that appears to infringe on their 
national sovereignty or the interests of citizens. 
This section of the report first examines the extent to which 
migration is recognized as a regional development issue. 
Section 4.2 presents the results of the NVIVO analysis of 
stakeholder interviews to assess the extent to which migra-
tion is seen as a regional issue and force for development. 
Section 4.3 discusses the limited success of initiatives to 
advance a common regional migration agenda by the SADC 
Secretariat. Section 4.4 provides a gender analysis of these 
regional initiatives. Section 4.5 examines other regional gov-
ernance initiatives, including the Migration Dialogue for 
Southern Africa (MIDSA) process. Section 4.6 identifies vari-
ous obstacles to a regional migration management approach 
in Southern Africa and highlights the importance of actions 
at the national level. Finally, and in that context, Section 
4.7 examines the proposed new approach by South Africa 
to migration management and whether this signifies a new 
sensitivity to regional migration realities. 
PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION 
AS A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
ISSUE 
There was a considerable degree of unanimity among the 
80 stakeholders interviewed for this study on the impor-
tance of seeing migration as a development issue requiring 
a co-ordinated regional response in Southern Africa. There 
was some expectation of a difference in opinion between 
regional and national stakeholders. However, many of the 
latter were also willing to acknowledge that migration was 
not only an issue of national importance. Where they dif-
fered was on who should be driving the agenda: national 
governments or regional bodies. The main points of consen-
sus among stakeholders were the following:
•	 There	is	a	pressing	need	for	a	regional	approach	to	migra-
tion and development in the SADC. The challenge is 
implementation; 
•	 Migration	within	and	to	the	SADC	region	is	beneficial	
for economic development, poverty reduction and inclu-
sive economic growth. Migration is a means of “levelling 
development” and reducing economic disparities; 
•	 Migration	to	and	from	a	country	and	within	the	SADC	
is an asset for the development of the regional economy, 
for poverty reduction and for inclusive economic growth. 
However, there is a need for proper planning and man-
agement of migration in the region in order to optimize 
the benefits; 
•	 Increased	development	in	the	region	will	not	necessarily	
reduce migration but could change migration patterns. 
It could reduce the economic reasons for migration and 
therefore mean less movement of unskilled labour. But 
there may be an increase in migration of skilled labour 
who believe they have better opportunities elsewhere;
•	 The	 criminalization	of	migration	 and	not	offering	 a	
legal route for migrants are challenges that need to be 
addressed. Greater freedom of movement of migrants for 
work or other economic activity within Southern Africa 
would be beneficial;
•	 The	free	movement	of	migrants	is	essential	but	most	
states reject it as infringing on their sovereign rights; 
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•	 A	number	 of	 respondents	 felt	 that	 national	 govern-
ments should be driving the migration and development 
agenda in the region and that it was important to move 
from the security focus towards an economic and devel-
opment focus. However, those with a more regional brief 
said that the SADC should drive the agenda even though 
the regional body was described by some as ineffective; 
and 
•	 Most	 respondents	 knew	 about	 some	 of	 the	 AU	 and	
regional protocols and agreements but none were famil-
iar with all. 
MIGRATION INITIATIVES AND THE 
SADC SECRETARIAT
Freedom of Movement
At the regional level, there is a paucity of instruments that 
focus directly on migration and development. An evaluation 
of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
(RISDP) concluded that: “It is disconcerting that the relation-
ship between migration and poverty is under-represented in 
the plan’s proposed intervention areas and only addressed 
in a partial and circumscribed manner.”62 
Freedom of intra-regional movement has been a principle 
of SADC since its foundation, although this is not explicitly 
tied to positive development outcomes. Article 5(2)(d) of the 
SADC Treaty (1992) states that the SADC shall “develop poli-
cies aimed at progressive elimination of obstacles to the free 
movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of 
the people of the region generally, among Member States.” 
Despite this objective, unfettered free movement is very far 
from being a reality. The Secretariat has had no success in 
getting all member states to ratify its two major regional 
mobility policy initiatives:
•	 The	1995	Draft	Protocol	on	the	Free	Movement	of	Per-
sons provided for members of one state to freely enter, 
establish themselves and work in another state. The 
Protocol was abandoned in 1998 after major opposition 
from South Africa, Botswana and Namibia;63 and
•	 The	2005	Draft	Protocol	on	the	Facilitation	of	Movement	
of Persons had similar provisions regarding visa-free 
entry, residence and establishment, but affirmed that 
migration management was a national competency. 
While calling for the harmonization of migration poli-
cies and legislation, it did not propose an over-arching 
regional migration policy and legislative framework. 
Instead, much of the protocol focuses on enhancing the 
capacities of states to individually and collectively regu-
late migration and strengthen border management. The 
Protocol was tabled in 2005 but by 2016 only six states 
(Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swazi-
land and Zambia) had ratified it, short of the 10 required 
for it to enter into force. 
The trumping of regional mobility initiatives by national 
immigration policies focused on movement control is clear 
to experts: “The non-ratification and enforcement of the 
SADC Facilitation Protocol, a much less ambitious objective 
than its free movement predecessor, raises questions about 
the region and its Member States’ political will and commit-
ment to migration governance.”64 
SADC member states prefer to act bilaterally in their dealings 
with each other on migration. This emphasis began in the 
1960s and 1970s (and the 1920s in the case of Mozambique 
and South Africa) when South Africa and its neighbours con-
cluded bilateral treaties to regulate and monitor the supply 
of migrant mineworkers to the South African mines. These 
agreements have never been officially repealed but are out-
dated and largely defunct. Since 2000, South Africa and 
neighbouring states have pursued new bilateral approaches 
(including on migration) through Joint Permanent Com-
missions (JPCs) and Memoranda of Understanding.65 The 
JPCs have facilitated some migration-related issues on a 
bilateral basis (visa waivers, for example) but they do not 
have explicit development-related goals. Further, it might 
be argued that if two states can achieve their basic goal of 
achieving greater control over migration through bilateral 
agreements, this acts as a further disincentive to implement 
multilateral instruments. 
At the level of individual member states, the mandate and 
expertise required for, and resources devoted to, migration 
management is often limited to routine and operational 
capacity requirements, as opposed to a more strategic 
approach in which migration management is an essential 
component of the development objectives of a particular 
state. An audit of Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans (PRSPs), 
for example, found that “the knowledge base on migration 
and development that does exist is weakly incorporated into 
poverty policy in the region.”66 The South African National 
Development Plan 2030 admits that “South Africa, like most 
other African countries, has done little to increase the ben-
efits of migration or reduce the risks migrants face.”67 
Little discernible progress has therefore been made with 
regard to the implementation of a free movement regime 
by the SADC Secretariat. In part, this is because there is very 
little data or analysis on the impact that removing border 
controls in the region would actually have. It is arguable that 
SADC is already a de facto free movement zone and that the 
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removal of controls would not have a dramatic impact on 
migration flows. What it would do is provide legal channels 
for those who want to migrate, reduce the opportunities for 
personal enrichment by corrupt state functionaries on both 
sides of borders, eliminate current high levels of corrup-
tion and abuse in the immigration system, and reduce the 
exploitation of migrants who enjoy few rights and protec-
tions. However, free movement is likely to remain politically 
unpalatable to most states for the foreseeable future. Greater 
opportunities for legal and regulated migration may there-
fore be the best way forward in the short and medium term.68 
Migrant Rights and Protections
One of the key components of inclusive growth strategies is 
poverty reduction through productive and decent employ-
ment. Given the high levels of poverty and inequality 
throughout Southern Africa, it is important to view migrant 
employment rights as an integral part of the inclusive growth 
agenda. Our recent study for UNRISD examined the issue of 
migrant protection and rights in the Southern African region 
as a whole and identified the various regional-level commit-
ments to protecting migrant rights and the obstacles to their 
implementation:69 
•	 The	core	international	legal	instrument	with	the	poten-
tial to protect migrants in the region is the 1990 UN 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(ICRMW). However, only Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozam-
bique and Seychelles are signatories to the ICRMW. In 
Southern Africa, as is the case globally, there is consider-
able resistance to this Convention;70 
•	 Within	 the	 SADC,	member	 states	 are	 committed	 to	
upholding fundamental human rights including employ-
ment rights as per the SADC Charter on Fundamental 
Social Rights. However, nowhere in the Charter are 
migrants mentioned explicitly and no provision is made 
for the portability of rights and protections across state 
borders;
•	 The	2008	Code	on	Social	Security	deals	with	migrants,	
foreign workers and refugees in Article 17, and explicitly 
states that member states should progressively reduce 
migration controls, that all legally employed migrants 
are entitled to the same social security as citizens, and 
that “illegal migrants” should enjoy “basic minimum 
protection.” The Code therefore acknowledges that the 
rights of migrants require attention but its non-binding 
character makes implementation problematic; 
•	 All	of	the	SADC	member	states	have	now	ratified	some	
of the core ILO Conventions dealing with labour rights 
(87, 100, 111 and 182). However, there are very low rati-
fication rates of others. For example, only three states 
have ratified the employment policy and occupational 
safety and health conventions and just two states (Mau-
ritius and South Africa) have ratified the 2011 Domestic 
Workers Convention. An assessment is needed of the 
implementation of ratified conventions as they pertain 
to migrant rights and the reasons for the low rates of rati-
fication of others, including those affecting key migrant 
work sectors;
•	 The	SADC	Protocol	on	Employment	and	Labour	was	
signed by Labour Ministers from all member states in 
2014.71 Article 19 deals with Labour Migration and 
Migrant Workers and contains several rights-based pro-
visions, stating that member states will endeavour to: 
(a) strengthen mechanisms to combat smuggling and 
human trafficking; (b) ensure that fundamental rights are 
accorded to non-citizens, in particular labour/employ-
ment and social protection rights; (c) adopt measures to 
provide for the special needs of migrant women, chil-
dren and youth; (d) adopt a regional migration policy 
in accordance with international conventions to ensure 
the protection of the rights of migrants; and (e) adopt 
measures to facilitate the co-ordination and portability 
of social security benefits for migrants. Two-thirds of the 
SADC member states need to ratify the Protocol for it to 
come into force but as of mid-2016 no states had done 
so. This prompted the SADC Labour Ministers to direct 
the SADC Secretariat, with the support of the ILO, to 
conduct a study to establish the problems underlying 
the non-ratification of the Protocol and explore ways to 
promote its ratification by member states. As with the 
Facilitation of Movement Protocol, the Employment and 
Labour Protocol may well remain an aspirational docu-
ment with little concrete implementation; and
•	 The	2014	SADC	Regional	Labour	Migration	Policy	Frame-
work has as one of its four main aims to “strengthen 
protection of the rights of migrant workers.”72 Member 
states are enjoined to strive to put in place by 2019 a 
national migration policy that includes explicit rights-
based objectives. The extensive list of rights for migrants 
contains two notable features: (a) it applies primarily 
to migrant workers in formal employment and not to 
undocumented, irregular or unregulated migrant work-
ers; and (b) it appears to apply mainly to migrants in 
employment and not self-employment. Apart from its 
non-binding character, there are several rights (especially 
concerning equal access and opportunity with nationals) 
that member states are unlikely to implement. 
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In sum, the SADC Secretariat has made various efforts to put 
in place instruments that commit member states to protect-
ing the rights of migrant workers. In practice, ratification 
and implementation are proving problematical as few mem-
ber states are willing to ratify the appropriate instruments. 
SADC Decent Work Programme 
A current SADC initiative, in collaboration with the ILO, is 
the SADC Decent Work Programme (DWP), which runs from 
2013 to 2019.73 Although targeted at work and labour in gen-
eral, the DWP does explicitly address migration and supports 
the principle of freer movement in the region. It identifies a 
“decent work deficit” as a motive for intra-regional migration 
and emphasizes that “all core international labour stand-
ards apply to all workers regardless of their nationality or 
immigration status, unless otherwise stated.” The DWP rec-
ognizes that increasing numbers of migrants in the region 
are women and has a specific section on gender that urges 
strengthened commitment to existing SADC gender policies 
and protocols. It calls on SADC states to ratify and imple-
ment existing ILO Conventions and observes that most 
SADC member states have not yet ratified either the ICRMW 
or the ILO Domestic Workers Convention. It includes as a 
planned output a SADC Protocol to Eliminate Human Traf-
ficking. Achievement of the DWP’s objectives, including 
ratification and implementation of the various ILO and UN 
Conventions (especially the Domestic Workers Convention) 
along with the proposed anti-trafficking Protocol, could ben-
efit migrants in the region. 
Strengthening Institutional  
Mechanisms for Migration 
Management
The European Union (EU) recently funded a project to 
strengthen the capacity of regional integration institutions 
and organizations including the SADC, COMESA, IOC and 
EAC in collaboration with the EU Delegation in Botswana 
with three components: (a) monitoring of migration flows; 
(b) addressing labour migration flows within Southern 
Africa; and (c) addressing mixed migration flows into the 
Southern Africa region. The first component is designed to 
co-ordinate the collection of reliable data and statistics and 
research for monitoring migration and border security con-
cerns. The main activities will include strengthening regional 
capacity for data collection, analysis and use, including 
through migration profiles, to better inform national and 
regional policies; standardizing migrant stocks and flows 
data collection within member states; establishing a formal 
data collection and exchange mechanism modelled on the 
European example; integrating migration modules in labour 
market surveys; and research, monitoring and evaluation on 
irregular migration, smuggling, trafficking and IDPs.
The second component is designed to co-ordinate South-
South labour mobility through targeted regional policies 
and programmes, and standardized frameworks, mecha-
nisms and tools. This component is motivated by the need 
for an overall regional policy framework to govern labour 
migration and harness the benefits of migration for sending, 
transit and receiving countries. Proposed activities including 
mapping regulatory frameworks for illegal employment and 
informal work, with emphasis on migrant protection; con-
sensus-building on regional migration policy priorities and 
harmonising operational procedures; harmonizing national 
labour and employment legislation on the rights of migrants 
and aligning this to regional treaties, protocols, the ILO con-
ventions and the AU Migration Framework; mainstreaming 
migration in the regional integration agendas of the eco-
nomic communities; raising public awareness on migrant 
rights; and educating and providing protection to abused 
migrant workers.
The third component is directed at strengthening migra-
tion management through policies and programmes on 
irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and traffick-
ing in migrants, refugees and internally displaced people 
(IDPs). As well as strengthening migration management, 
this component is designed to strengthen law enforcement 
to develop and implement regional policies on trafficking; 
develop regional and national policies to address smuggling 
of migrants and unaccompanied children; develop a regional 
framework to manage asylum-seekers, refugees and IDPs; and 
develop a regional framework for addressing disaster-induced 
displacement and migration. 
GENDER ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL 
INITIATIVES
A gender analysis of the various AU and SADC strategic 
instruments shows that gender and migration issues do fea-
ture, albeit in piecemeal fashion:
•	 Gender	is	paid	explicit	attention	within	the	AU	Migra-
tion Framework: first, within the section on Labour 
Migration; second, as an emphasis within the section 
on Migrant Smuggling; third, as a category of vulner-
able persons in the section on Forced Migration; and, 
finally, in a separate sub-section on Migration and Gen-
der under “Other Social Issues”. The AU Framework refers 
to a number of UN and ILO Conventions and Protocols, 
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including the ICRMW and Domestic Workers Conven-
tion, urging their ratification and adoption by member 
states. The sections on gender point to the growing 
feminization of migration, including for labour in the 
care sector, but place greater emphasis on the vulner-
ability of female migrants to exploitation, trafficking 
and sexual slavery. Similar observations on the growing 
feminization of African migration and exploitation of 
female migrants are evident in the 2006 African Com-
mon Position on Migration and Development. Women 
migrants would benefit from the rights, protections and 
promotion of freer migration that are set out in the AU 
Framework and African Common Position. Yet these 
AU recommendations, while important and desirable as 
goals, are weakened by being non-binding and deferring 
to national laws and policies;
•	 The	AU’s	Labour	Migration	Governance	for	Develop-
ment and Integration in Africa (Joint Labour Migration 
Programme, or JLMP) was developed by the AU Com-
mission in conjunction with the ILO, IOM and UNECA. 
This was formally adopted at the African Union Assembly 
in 2015. Among the key features of African migration 
identified in the JLMP is the increased feminization of 
labour mobility within and from the continent. Its rec-
ommendations include enhanced collection and analysis 
of gender disaggregated data on migrants’ “economic 
activity, employment, skills, education, working condi-
tions, and social protection.” It also references the AU 
Labour and Social Affairs Commission’s 2013 Youth and 
Women Employment Pact that includes the “promotion 
of regional and sub-regional labour mobility” as one of 
its goals; 
•	 The	SADC’s	Charter	of	Fundamental	Social	Rights	(2003)	
refers explicitly to the UN Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights and ILO Constitution, but is couched largely in 
the language of workers’ rights. It contains no express 
provisions dealing with the social rights of migrants as 
a category. Gender rights of “equality between men and 
women” are expressed in terms of employment, remu-
neration, equal opportunities and the right to reconcile 
occupational and family obligations. Given the infor-
mal nature of many female migrants’ livelihoods, formal 
labour protection instruments may have limited impact 
in practice. The Social Charter is also weakly enforced;
•	 Article	19	of	the	SADC	2014	Protocol	on	Employment	
and Labour includes a clause “to adopt measures to 
provide for the special needs of women, children and 
youth”. Article 20 calls for the promotion of productivity, 
decent work and rights protection in the informal sector, 
which is of particular significance for migrant women. 
The Employment and Labour Protocol references other 
instruments, such as the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gen-
der and Development, and includes gender equity and 
equality as specific objectives. However, the Protocol’s 
commitments on paper would need to be turned into 
effective national laws and policies and practical local 
interventions if they are to become meaningful tools to 
protect migrant women’s rights and support their eco-
nomic contributions; 
•	 The	2007	Code	on	Social	Security	aims	at	the	co-ordina-
tion, convergence and harmonization of social security 
provisions and laws in SADC member states. Article 13 
of the Code deals with “Gender” and Article 17 with 
“Migrants, Foreign Workers and Refugees”. The gender 
provisions in the Code include equal access to social 
security by men and women, gender sensitization in 
the social security system, abolition of discriminatory 
laws and practices, and strategies for the eradication of 
poverty and economic empowerment of women. Pro-
visions for migrants are expressed in terms of different 
migrant categories. In addition to urging states to work 
towards regional free movement of persons, the Code 
holds that legal migrants should enjoy equal treatment 
alongside citizens in social security systems and that 
states should facilitate the portability of benefits across 
borders. Combined, the Code’s gender and migrant pro-
visions should in theory provide a framework for female 
migrants’ access to social security, but the reality is that 
state-provided social security is limited in most SADC 
member states even for citizens; 
•	 Remarkably,	for	a	document	that	is	otherwise	so	broad-
ranging, including reference to a suite of international 
Conventions and Charters, the 2008 Protocol on Gen-
der and Development almost entirely omits reference 
to migration. There is reference to “human trafficking, 
especially of women and children.” Along with the 
anti-trafficking provision, the Gender Protocol does 
include recommendations for adequate remuneration 
and protection of agricultural and domestic workers and 
recognition of women’s contribution in the informal sec-
tor. These could be interpreted as potentially beneficial 
to migrant women in those occupational categories, 
especially when read in conjunction with the 2014 
Employment and Labour Protocol; and
•	 Most	of	the	rights	and	protections	in	the	SADC’s	2014	
Labour Migration Policy Framework are expressed in gen-
der-neutral terms of migrant workers and their families, 
but there are express provisions to “harness positive gen-
der considerations and demographic dividends” of labour 
migration, along with elimination of discrimination and 
abolition of forced and child labour. As formulated and 
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adopted, the Framework stands to benefit all migrant 
workers, although its emphasis on formal employment 
makes it potentially less applicable to women migrants. 
Its effectiveness, moreover, depends on its recommen-
dations being actively adopted and implemented by 
national governments.
In sum, there are challenges in advancing gender-sensitive, 
rights-based migration governance in the SADC region. The 
scale, complexity and diversity of migration, combined with 
incomplete and inconsistent data, certainly make it difficult 
to measure and monitor the gender composition of migrant 
flows and stocks, or to understand the particular contribu-
tions and vulnerabilities of female migrants. 
Regional-level instruments, polices and protocols do exist, 
but these are barely enforced and national laws and institu-
tions take precedence. The persistent limitations of migration 
governance on the continent have been recognized as an 
obstacle to regional and continental poverty reduction by 
the African Development Bank in a report that also points to 
the vulnerability and marginalization of female migrants.74 
Furthermore, policies and instruments to protect migrant 
and gender rights are implemented within a difficult social 
and political context in which xenophobic and patriarchal 
attitudes persist. 
Overall, SADC and AU policies and protocols on migration 
tend to emphasize the vulnerability of female migrants, 
rather than their role as active economic actors and con-
tributors to development. A recent Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) briefing on women and migration concludes 
that “[f]or women and girls to benefit from mobility, policies 
must support the empowerment and economic benefits of 
migration and also increase protection of female migrants.”75 
This dual focus on empowerment and protection should 
guide programming and policy development on gender and 
migration in the region.
MIGRATION DIALOGUE FOR 
SOUTHERN AFRICA (MIDSA) 
Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) has 
become the forum that most clearly articulates the relation-
ship between migration and development in regional and 
national policy discussions and tends to drive the regional 
migration and development debate within the SADC.76 
MIDSA is one of several global and African Regional Con-
sultative Processes (RCPs) on migration that have emerged 
since the mid-1990s. These are informal, non-binding, inter-
state forums for dialogue on migration matters of mutual 
interest.77 MIDSA was founded in Mbabane, Swaziland, in 
November 2000 and convened regular inter-governmental 
forums attended by senior bureaucrats from Departments 
of Immigration and Home Affairs in member states (as well 
as other ministries on an ad hoc basis).78 In 2010, MIDSA 
was scaled up to ministerial level with a conference in 
Windhoek on Managing Migration through Regional Co-
operation.79 A second Inter-Ministerial Conference was 
convened in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2013 on Enhancing 
Labour Migration in the SADC Region and a third in Victoria 
Falls, Zimbabwe, in 2015 on Addressing Mixed and Irregular 
Migration in the SADC Region: Protection of the Unaccom-
panied Migrant Child. 
In 2012, MIDSA developed a Regional Roadmap on Enhanc-
ing Intra-Regional Migration for Sustainable Development. 
The roadmap was subsequently revised and endorsed as an 
Action Plan at the MIDSA Ministerial in Maputo in 2013. 
The Action Plan is non-binding and there is some overlap 
between its recommendations and those of the SADC Labour 
Migration Policy Framework and Article 19 of the Protocol 
on Employment and Labour. However, it also covers a range 
of other development-related areas that are absent from the 
SADC instruments. The current plan is that governments 
will annually report progress in achieving the goals of the 
MIDSA Action Plan.80
As acknowledged by the senior officials and Ministers who 
participate in MIDSA, it is precisely the informal, non-bind-
ing and consultative nature of the process that makes it 
possible to develop recommendations that would not have 
been made if they were to be binding on participating states. 
This does not mean that these conclusions and recommen-
dations are of no value – on the contrary, it is because MIDSA 
acts as an awareness-raising “clearing house” that formal 
processes on migration and development within the SADC, 
and even at national level, might be able to advance at a 
more rapid pace in future. The SADC Secretariat has been 
a regular participant in MIDSA, although the relationship 
has remained informal. In 2013, as part of a sustainability 
strategy, member states agreed that MIDSA should be incor-
porated into formal SADC structures and processes, though 
this has yet to take place. There are questions about whether 
and when this should happen, and whether it could negate 
the value of the MIDSA process in driving the debate about 
migration and development in the region.
Unlike other RCPs, MIDSA has relied on donors for funding 
its activities without financial contributions from member 
states. This outside funding is of a short-term nature. While 
the IOM plays a strong leadership and organizational role, it 
does not guarantee the MIDSA’s sustainability. While there is 
a significant international literature endorsing the value of 
RCPs in building regional co-operation on migration, there 
has been no systematic evaluation of the achievements and 
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impact of MIDSA in its 16 years of operation. Until this has 
been undertaken, results-based donors and member states 
may be reluctant to commit the resources to sustain MIDSA’s 
goal of advancing a development agenda around migration 
in Southern Africa.
CHALLENGES FACING A 
REGIONAL RESPONSE
Stakeholder Perceptions of Challenges
The stakeholder interviews elicited a wide range of opinions 
on the obstacles to a regionally co-ordinated and harmonized 
response to harnessing regional migration for development 
and inclusive growth. The results of the NVIVO analysis of 
responses are summarized below:
•	 The	main	obstacle	to	a	regional	response	is	 the	high	
level of economic disparity between SADC member 
states. This has led to a level of protectionism among 
the economically stronger states. High poverty levels 
within SADC countries are also an obstacle to a regional 
response. Addressing the issue of inequality and poverty 
on a national level is prioritized by governments, thus 
deflecting their focus from regional to domestic issues; 
•	 Another	major	obstacle	to	the	implementation	of	SADC	
regional migration policies and agreements is a lack of 
political commitment at the national level. Other obsta-
cles to implementation are lack of data and information 
and lack of capacity of government officials. SADC coun-
tries overcommit to international issues and do not have 
the apparatus to manage regional agreements; 
•	 Other	challenges	of	implementing	a	regional	approach	
include limited funding for tackling migration and 
development issues at the regional level; no regional 
or strategic plans; limited information and interest by 
member states to focus on migration as a regional issue; 
limited implementation of various protocols and lack of 
enforcement mechanisms; and different administrative 
systems in place in each member state; 
•	 Xenophobia	is	a	major	obstacle	to	a	regional	approach	as	
migrants often become scapegoats for a lack of govern-
ment delivery. In order to tackle the issue of xenophobia 
the following were mentioned: awareness raising; educat-
ing communities; creating understanding of the role of 
migration in labour development and national develop-
ment in the country; training the media; and getting 
policy makers to understand the positive role of migra-
tion in development;
•	 Ideas	about	how	the	ratification	of	inter-governmental	
agreements and protocols might be fast-tracked include 
a SADC commission of government officials and experts 
to make recommendations and move forward as matter 
of urgency; to create a timeframe for ratification; and 
to implement advocacy workshops with parliamentar-
ians to lobby the SADC heads of state for ratification of 
instruments. If a government feels that a protocol is not 
in line with its interests it will not fast-track it. To address 
this, there is a need for diplomacy and negotiation which 
should involve helping each country understand the 
value of migration and appreciate the benefits for their 
country of ratification and of creating an enabling envi-
ronment for migrants;
•	 Harmonization	of	migration	policies	is	a	key	goal.	Har-
monization of national policies in the SADC region is 
gradually occurring through the MIDSA process and the 
SADC Labour Migration Framework. However, unless 
governments integrate migration into national develop-
ment plans and budget for this, it is impossible to expect 
implementation; and 
•	 There	is	a	gap	in	reliable	data	around	migration	with	
most people using estimates. The quality and availability 
of data for mapping migration flows and for under-
standing the impacts of migration on development is 
poor. Greater evidence production would enhance 
inter-governmental co-operation in terms of migration 
management.
Political Analysis of Challenges 
•	 Absence of Political Will: This refers to the unwilling-
ness of governments to commit to the development and 
implementation of specific regional policies and pro-
grammes. However, most of the existing agreements and 
protocols are signed at ministerial level. Thus, at least at 
the level of principled agreement, there does seem to be 
a degree of political will and a commitment to the less 
contentious regional instruments. 
•	 Lack of Capacity: A significant reason for the slow 
progress in developing a cohesive set of policies and pro-
grammes aimed at harnessing the development benefits 
of migration, both at national and regional level, is the 
absence of properly mandated and resourced institutions. 
This is not limited to the SADC Secretariat or national 
governments – many of the civil society organizations 
involved in migration-related research or programmes 
are also constrained by lack of resources. The absence of 
knowledge and expertise, as well as technical, logistical 
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and financial resources, provides a major impediment to 
both the development of appropriate policies and pro-
grammes and their implementation. Lack of capacity is 
a problem that needs to be addressed before significant 
progress in implementation can be made. 
•	 Overlapping Institutional Mandates: Migration is often 
referred to as a cross-cutting issue, requiring a high level 
of co-operation and cohesiveness between government 
ministries and departments within national govern-
ments, which in turn needs to be replicated between 
governments at the regional scale. At the level of the 
SADC Secretariat, this “dilemma of jurisdiction” is 
reflected in the fact that while it is the custodian of the 
Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, the 
actual development of migration-related policies and 
programmes is located elsewhere – in the case of labour 
migration, within the SADC Employment and Labour 
Sector. Ideally, and consistent with proposed approaches 
to mainstreaming migration in national development 
policies and programmes, the institutional mandate and 
authority to develop and implement such policies and 
programmes should be located in the highest office at the 
national level and at the level of the SADC within one 
part of the Secretariat, possibly the Directorate of Human 
Development and Special Programmes. 
•	 Disjuncture Between Regional and National Priori-
ties: The fact that many of the regional agreements are 
not reflected in national policies, legislation and pro-
grammes partly accounts for the slow progress because 
implementation largely depends on national govern-
ments allocating the necessary resources. This is often 
not done because regional migration priorities are not 
seen as consistent with national priorities. Many govern-
ments prefer to view migration in negative terms, as a 
threat to the interests of citizens and in need of control. 
In this respect they often echo the views of their constit-
uents who want to see a reduction in migration, tighter 
controls, increased border controls, enforcement and 
deportations, and who exhibit very low levels of toler-
ance of migrants even from neighbouring countries. This 
inauspicious environment, in which the views of citizens 
and the actions of governments are mutually reinforcing, 
does not help national-level discussion about the devel-
opment implications and value of regional migration. 
•	 Absence of Reliable Data and Information: General 
migration patterns and dynamics are reasonably well 
documented but the development and inclusive growth 
impacts of migration for countries of origin and destina-
tion are less well understood, even among researchers. 
The need for data collection and research also has a 
downstream function to assess the potential and out-
come of alternative policy choices. Similar to lack of 
capacity, when lack of data is offered as a reason for slow 
progress, it is often dismissed as an excuse. However, it 
may in fact account for the lack of political commitment 
in some cases, since policymakers are unlikely to intro-
duce new policies and programmes if they are uncertain 
about potential outcomes.
SOUTH AFRICA’S NEW MIGRATION 
PARADIGM 
Basic Principles
South Africa’s promised new migration paradigm was given 
policy substance by the gazetting of the Green Paper on 
International Migration in South Africa in Government 
Gazette No. 40088 on 24 June 2016. The drafting of the 
Green Paper represents the second major effort at over-
hauling South Africa’s immigration policy. The first process 
began in 1997 when both a Green Paper and White Paper 
were published and ended when the Refugees Act of 1998 
and the Immigration Act of 2002 were adopted (following 
which there were several amendments to both the legisla-
tion and the regulations, but no substantive redrafting). In 
many ways, the Green Paper represents a significant depar-
ture from the way in which migration is currently managed, 
not least because it begins to provide significant clarity in 
terms of policy vision and intent, even though there is still 
a substantial need for discussion and consultation. 
The Green Paper displays a fundamental tension between 
existing control-oriented, securitized approaches to migra-
tion which start from the premise that migrants are a threat 
or risk to national sovereignty and a more optimistic view 
that migration can be harnessed for national interests. What 
these contrasting, and at times contradictory, positions share 
is the view that migration policy is fundamentally a matter 
of protecting national sovereignty and national self-interest. 
In this respect, the Green Paper advocates the need for a set 
of common goals and objectives around which migration 
policy can be developed and strategically managed to con-
tribute towards the achievement of South Africa’s national 
priorities, such as nation-building and social cohesion, inclu-
sive economic growth and national security. At its heart, 
therefore, is the articulation and defence of national sover-
eignty and self-interest rather than any broader commitment 
to regional migration management, regional development 
and the realities of South Africa’s dominant economic role 
in the region.
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In looking towards the framing of a new set of policy param-
eters, the Green Paper sets out key principles for migration 
policy:
•		 South	Africa	has	a	sovereign	right	to	manage	interna-
tional migration in its national interests;
•		 International	migration	policy	must	be	oriented	towards	
Africa;
•		 International	migration	policy	must	contribute	towards	
nation-building and social cohesion;
•		 International	migration	policy	must	enable	South	Afri-
cans living abroad to contribute to national development 
priorities; and
•		 The	efficient	and	secure	management	of	migration	is	the	
responsibility of individual countries, all countries col-
lectively and regional structures.
The most controversial proposals in the Green Paper relate 
to the country’s refugee protection regime and policy pro-
posals to make it far less welcoming of asylum-seekers and 
refugees. These proposals are based on the assumption that 
the existing system is overwhelmed by bogus asylum-seekers, 
a highly contentious argument given that it could equally 
be argued that South Africa’s failure to develop a coherent 
response to the Zimbabwean crisis is the root cause of the 
phenomenon of asylum-seeking by economic migrants (a 
problem now largely overcome by the granting of amnesty 
to Zimbabweans). The associated argument is that the courts 
were wrong in granting asylum-seekers the right to work. By 
removing this right, and confining asylum-seekers to recep-
tion centres, it is assumed that the practice of asylum-seeking 
by economic migrants will cease. This, of course, completely 
ignores evidence of the positive economic contribution of 
refugees and asylum-seekers who, under existing law, are 
permitted to pursue economic livelihoods.
Here we focus on the policy proposals that have clear devel-
opment-oriented motivations and intended outcomes. 
Skills Migration
The Green Paper acknowledges that South Africa has criti-
cal skills shortages, that these gaps can be filled through 
immigration and that the country needs to compete on the 
global skills market. Much of this is consistent with current 
strategies, but as the GP correctly notes, the system is admin-
istratively inefficient and lacks flexibility. What is lacking, 
according to the GP, is an institutional arrangement that 
ensures that labour market information is analyzed and used 
to make strategic decisions on the recruitment and retention 
of skills.
The Green Paper proposes (a) a points-based system as a 
means of transparent recruitment (something first proposed 
in the 1997 draft Green Paper and rejected by the then Min-
ister of Home Affairs); (b) that desirable immigrants should 
be fast-tracked to permanent residence, a major departure 
from current policy that is fixated on temporary migra-
tion; and (c) South Africa should increase its skills pool by 
retaining students who have come to study in the country. 
Although acknowledging that this could lead to a loss of 
trained professionals for other African countries, and the 
SADC region, this is clearly trumped by national self-interest. 
Whether newly-minted graduates have the skills and experi-
ence to fill skills needs is, of course, questionable. In essence, 
since so many of South Africa’s international students are 
from the SADC region, the proposed options for student 
retention are likely to advantage South Africa and disadvan-
tage the region as a whole. 
Diaspora Engagement
Unlike previous policy drafting exercises and proposals, the 
Green Paper includes and emphasizes the need for a pro-
active approach to engaging with South Africans in the 
diaspora. The proposal involves setting up a diaspora institu-
tion to consolidate and integrate existing initiatives, but also 
to expand engagement to include exchange programmes, 
investment, facilitating remittance transfers, and return and 
reintegration. The GP acknowledges that South Africa has no 
diaspora engagement policy nor an institutional mechanism 
for co-ordinating engagement. It notes that such institutions 
perform at least four functions: (a) promotion of emigration 
to meet varied national goals such as labour and invest-
ment; (b) exportation and student exchange programmes; 
(c) tapping into the resources of the diaspora – remittances, 
investment, tourism and the sharing of skills and knowledge; 
(d)?embracing diaspora communities through multinational 
citizenship, consular services, country ambassadors and re-
integration programmes; and (d) reintegration of returnees.
The Green Paper proposes the establishment of a diaspora 
institution to (a) consolidate existing initiatives under a sin-
gle multifaceted emigration strategy; (b) establish a formal 
and permanent mechanism to co-ordinate relevant govern-
ment agencies and public policies relating to the needs of 
South African expatriates; (c) registration of South African 
expatriates and provision of consular services; (d) establish-
ment of diaspora forums in countries with a high number 
of South African expatriates; (e) establishment of diaspora 
ambassadorial and knowledge networks; (f) provide ways 
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in which emigrants can transfer skills back to South Africa, 
such as visiting lectureships and public and private sector 
partnerships; (g) incentive schemes that will motivate South 
African expatriates to invest in the country; (h) a reintegra-
tion programme for those who want to return home; and 
(i)?support mechanisms for those who want to emigrate for 
study and work purposes.
The idea that the diaspora is a potential development 
resource is a major departure from existing policy, as is the 
proposal to institutionalize diaspora engagement. However, 
as the GP notes, “further research in this area needs to be 
undertaken and to inform proposals for the creation of a 
South African diaspora institution.”
Management of Regional Migration 
The Green Paper constantly reiterates its African orientation. 
From a migration and development perspective, this section 
contains arguably one of the most important policy consid-
erations for South Africa, and one that is significantly absent 
from the current policy as framed by the 1999 White Paper 
on International Migration. Locating the issue of migration 
within the broader context of regional integration, this sec-
tion effectively proposes that migration is a key element 
both as a means towards, as well as an outcome of, integra-
tion and development in Africa.
Following an analysis of some of the existing instruments 
and initiatives pertaining to migration, the GP effectively 
commits South Africa to the development of a migration 
policy that supports the efforts of regional bodies to achieve 
higher levels of integration, which by implication means a 
commitment to free movement, or at least facilitating the 
movement of persons. Of particular relevance is the focus of 
the Green Paper on the management of economic migration 
from the SADC region to South Africa.
The Green Paper recognizes not only the historical reality 
of economic migration to South Africa from other SADC 
member states, but also argues that migration patterns are 
unlikely to change and that policy has to be responsive to 
this reality. Specifically, it recognizes the challenges related 
to low-skilled economic migration and puts forward poten-
tial policy options to be considered. In these options, the GP 
essentially takes a middle-of-the-road approach, noting the 
absence of regulated mechanisms for low-skilled economic 
migration while acknowledging the futility of trying to stop 
it. 
On the other hand, the Green Paper acknowledges that free 
movement is not a reality and thus proposes a permitting 
regime that would facilitate the movement of low-skilled 
economic migrants and entrepreneurs from other SADC 
member states. These include a quota-based SADC special 
work visa, a SADC trader’s visa and a SADC SME visa. In 
essence, these visas represent a special dispensation to low-
skilled economic migrants from SADC, albeit with specific 
requirements and conditions. This is a significant departure 
from the current policy approach, which does not make 
provision for low-skilled economic migrants. This lack of 
provision, the Green Paper argues, results in higher levels of 
irregular migration and “strategic asylum-seeking”.
The Green Paper argues that it would be easier to develop 
bilateral agreements with specific countries than attempting 
to develop multilateral agreements that, by definition, would 
take longer to conclude and implement.
This integrationist approach to migration policy represents 
a more welcoming and positive approach to low-skilled eco-
nomic migrants from the SADC region but the Green Paper 
does not discuss the potential response from South Africans 
to such an approach and makes no proposals to mitigate 
potential negative reaction. 
Development Implications
The focus on the need to harness the benefits of migration 
for development and, in particular, the emphasis on “man-
aging migration in the national interest” suggests that there is 
a long-term policy view that no longer confines the man-
agement of migration to regulating the entry and exit of 
persons, but fundamentally links it to the aspirations, needs 
and developmental priorities of the country. Less articulated 
is a vision for South Africa’s role in regional development 
or an assessment of what the implementation of policies 
animated by national interests might mean for other SADC 
countries.
That said, the Green Paper does recognize the need to link 
migration policy and management to the imperatives of con-
tinental and specifically SADC co-operation and integration. 
In this regard, the proposals pertaining to the special permits 
and other mechanisms for citizens of SADC member states 
and other African countries are particularly relevant. Regret-
tably, these proposals may prove to be the most controversial 
and difficult to implement, given the current public climate 
of hostility towards all migrants in South Africa. The GP 
does not specifically address the issue of official and public 
sentiments and attitudes towards migrants and migration 
in any substantive detail. Given that these policy proposals 
represent a significant departure from prevailing practice, 
the need for consensus-building around these proposals, 
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focusing on a set of shared interests and outcomes, is criti-
cally important. 
Gender and Migration
The Green Paper mostly treats economic and humanitar-
ian migration streams as if they are gender-neutral flows of 
individuals bearing identifiable attributes or skills. Given 
the strongly gendered nature of the labour markets (skilled 
and unskilled) in which migrants do or will participate, 
the specific employment sectors and skills determinants by 
which prospective immigrants will be admitted will have 
different effects on men and women and produce gender-
imbalanced migration streams. None of the data presented 
in the Statistical Profiles of International Migrants in the 
GP is broken down by gender. This makes it impossible to 
identify the gender composition of current migrant flows or 
how these change over time or vary by employment sector, 
visa category or country of origin. Collection and analy-
sis of gender-disaggregated data should be undertaken to 
assess the impact of current policy and inform further policy 
development. 
The absence of consideration of gender or sexual identity 
in the section on refugees and asylum-seekers is notable. 
The GP proposes substantial changes to the current refu-
gee and asylum policy and practice. Considerable attention 
is given to the “safe third country” principle, and there is 
a proposal to establish asylum-seeker processing centres 
near South Africa’s borders, where asylum-seekers would be 
accommodated while their applications are processed. Each 
of these measures, if implemented, raises concerns in terms 
of gender and sexual identity. Politically stable countries 
designated as “safe” may not be so for individuals seeking 
asylum on grounds of social rather than political persecution 
– for example, people who identify as LGBTQ. Asylum-seeker 
processing centres are likely to be difficult places in which 
to guarantee safety and protection for women, children and 
other vulnerable groups. The proposed restriction of the 
right of asylum-seekers to work removes an important sur-
vival strategy and may force women (and men) into practices 
that make them vulnerable to violence and exploitation, 
such as sex work. 
No migration policy can be entirely gender-neutral in its 
outcome and impact. Furthermore, to ignore the gender 
dimensions of migration policy risks undermining both 
economic objectives and humanitarian obligations. It is 
important that gender considerations be incorporated in 
the next stages of policy development. 
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CHAPTER 5: OPTIONS AND 
ENTRY POINTS
INTRODUCTION
A regional migration programme for Southern Africa needs 
to be guided by, and contribute directly to, the implementa-
tion of various strategic regional instruments. This section 
therefore presents the results of an analysis of the provisions 
and recommendations of these regional and inter-regional 
strategic frameworks/agreements. All of the instruments con-
tain specific recommendations for programming that could 
harness migration for development and inclusive growth. 
Section 5.2 develops a 10-point thematic programming 
framework (PF) based on the objectives and content of the 
instruments and then extracts and classifies specific recom-
mendations from each instrument and incorporates them 
into the PF.
Section 5.3 then uses the PF to classify the existing regional 
migration-related programmes on which information was 
collected in the fieldwork and are currently being imple-
mented or planned in Southern Africa. This analysis has 
three main purposes: (a) to identify areas already covered 
by existing programmes; (b) to identify gaps in current pro-
gramme and/or areas that need strengthening; and (c) to 
identify the main stakeholders involved in regional migra-
tion for development and inclusive growth. 
PRIORITY PROGRAMMING  
AREAS IDENTIFIED IN  
MIGRATION INSTRUMENTS
A major objective of this report is to relate potential pro-
gramming for harnessing migration for development and 
inclusive growth to relevant continental and regional strate-
gic instruments. A systematic approach to these instruments 
could assist in briefing all stakeholders about their objectives, 
content and relevance to migration in Southern Africa. The 
instruments reviewed include the following:
•	 2016	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs)
•	 2015	Valetta	Accord	(VA)
•	 2006	African	Union	Framework	(AUF)	
•	 2006	African	Common	Position	on	Migration	and	Devel-
opment (ACP)
•	 AU	Joint	Labour	Migration	Programme	for	Africa	(JLMP)
TABLE 14: PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK
Issue Entry Points
Addressing the Relationship between Migration and Development Mitigating Root Causes Mainstreaming Migration
Enhancing Regional Co-operation on Migration Management for Development
Facilitating Free Movement 
Harmonizing Policies and Frameworks 
Building Institutional Capacity 
Promoting Decent Employment
Implementing Better Policies 
Guaranteeing Better Work 
Designing Temporary Programmes
Ensuring Rights and Protections for Migrants
Eliminating Exploitation 
Securing Social Protection 
Countering Xenophobia 
Facilitating Skills Migration
Removing Barriers 
Recognizing Qualifications 
Retaining/Importing/Building Skills
Adding Value to Remittances
Improving Financial Literacy 
Reducing Remittance Costs 
Optimizing Remittance Uses
Incorporating Gender Dimensions of Migration Promoting Awareness Supporting Female Migrants
Building Migrant Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurial Support Cross-Border Trade
Engaging Diasporas Building Linkages Encouraging Contributions
Creating a Knowledge Platform
Migration Data Collection 
Information Exchange 
Research Priorities 
Capacity-Building
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TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS
1. Addressing the Relationship between Migration and Development
Mitigating Root Causes
■ Enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in regions of origin and transit of migrants, including through 
public and private investment in favour of agriculture and rural economy development (VA).
■ Put in place strategies aimed at reducing poverty, improving living and working conditions, creating employment opportunities and 
developing skills that can contribute to addressing the root causes of migration (AUF).
■ Acknowledge that productive investments can help to address some of the causes of migration, recognize the need to promote eco-
nomic growth by fostering trade, productive investment and employment, and implement economic and social policies geared towards 
alleviating migration pressures (AUF).
Mainstreaming Migration
■ Integrate migration in development and poverty eradication strategies and programmes, in particular in areas such as labour market/
employment, private sector development, education, health, social protection and security (VA).
■ Facilitate technical co-operation activities with international agencies and other concerned entities to enhance the developmental 
effects of labour migration (AUF).
■ Encourage AU member states to integrate migration and development policies in their national development plans (AUF).
■ Integrate migration and displacement issues into the national and regional agenda for security and stability in addition to development 
and co-operation (AUF).
■ Include migration in the framework of development strategies and national and regional programming with the purpose of supporting 
the economic and social development of the regions from which migrants originate in order to address the root causes of migration and 
reduce poverty (AUF).
■ Mainstream migration in national development plans (ACP).
■ Conduct training workshops for participants from government, private sector, civil society and worker organizations on mainstreaming 
migration into national development policies (MIDSA).
■ Strengthen regional integration and inclusive development (JLMP).
•	 2005	SADC	Protocol	on	the	Facilitation	of	Movement	of	
Persons (SADC Facilitation)
•	 2014	MIDSA	Action	Plan	(MAP)
•	 SADC	Labour	Migration	Policy	Framework	(SADC	LMPF)
•	 SADC	Protocol	on	Employment	and	Labour	(SADC	EL)
To classify the many recommendations and commitments 
in these instruments, and to identify areas common to each, 
we developed a programming framework (or PF) with 10 
issues and related entry points. We then extracted any spe-
cific recommendations relating to harnessing migration for 
development in each instrument and allocated them to the 
appropriate issue and entry point. 
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2. Enhancing Regional Co-operation on Migration Management for Development
Facilitating Free Movement
■ Step up efforts to promote legal migration and mobility within bilateral co-operation frameworks such as Mobility Partnerships and 
Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (VA).
■ Enhance co-operation and co-ordination among states in sub-regions and regions with a view to facilitating free movement from which 
an Africa-wide framework on the free movement of persons should be developed (AUF).
■ Harmonize sub-regional migration policies to promote free movement and right of residence (AUF).
■ Ensure intra-African freedom of movement of migratory flows (ACP). 
■ Achieve wider elaboration, adoption and implementation of harmonized free circulation regimes and coherent national labour migration 
policy in the regional economic communities (JLMP).
■ Facilitate the movement of persons in the SADC as a vehicle for achieving economic integration (SADC Movement). 
Harmonizing Policies and Frameworks
■ Support continental, regional and sub-regional frameworks for mobility and migration (VA).
■ Develop a common migration policy among African countries towards harmonization of laws, standards, procedures, information, dis-
semination and sharing, statistics, documents, and efficient use of resources (AUF).
■ Look for collective solutions to migration through bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements and dialogue in a manner that benefits 
all parties: origin country, destination country and migrants (AUF).
■ Develop national and regional migration policy frameworks to address national/regional migration issues (MAP).
■ Draft a template for common regional standard operating practices related to migration management (MAP).
■ Encourage the development of migration policies for member states that do not have a policy in place (MAP).
■ Harmonization of national labour and employment legislations on the rights of foreign workers aligning to various treaties, protocols 
and conventions (SADC LMPF).
■ Adoption of a common set of co-operation principles on labour migration (SADC LMPF).
■ Mapping and harmonization of legislation leading to the adoption of consistent policy frameworks at sub-regional level (SADC LMPF).
■ Ensure coherence between labour migration, employment policies and other development strategies within member states (SADC EL).
Building Institutional Capacity
■ Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and 
well-managed migration policies (SDG Target 10.7) 
■ Set up national and sub-regional social dialogue mechanisms to address migrant labour issues (AUF).
■ Encourage regional consultative processes and dialogue on irregular migration to promote greater policy coherence at the national, 
sub-regional and regional levels (AUF).
■ Establish regional mechanisms for tripartite policy consultation and co-ordination on labour migration issues, and facilitate consultation 
and co-operation with other regions (JLMP).
■ Initiate dialogue with other Regional Co-operative Processes, such as EAC and COMESA, in order to discuss migration in an integrated 
manner and find solutions inter-regionally (MAP).
■ Design and implement a capacity-building training programme for government, civil society, private sector and worker organizations 
(MAP). 
■ Create a SADC labour litigation mechanism (SADC LMPF).
■ Technical training and assistance to migration and labour ministries, unions and employers’ organizations on migrant workers’ rights, 
drawing on international, regional and SADC frameworks (SADC LMPF).
■ Strengthen labour inspectorates across SADC member states (SADC LMPF).
■ Create a legal and policy framework within the SADC through harmonized labour and social security legislation (SADC EL).
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3. Promoting Decent Employment 
Implementing Better Policies 
■ Establish regular, transparent and comprehensive labour migration policies, legislation and structures at national and regional level 
(AUF).
■ Implement labour migration policies and legislation that incorporate appropriate labour standards to benefit labour migrants and 
members of their families (AUF).
■ Incorporate provisions from ILO Conventions 97 and 142 into policy (AUF).
■ Create transparent (open) and accountable labour recruitment and admissions systems based on clear legislative categories and 
harmonizing immigration policies with labour laws (AUF).
■ Strengthen governance and regulation of labour migration and mobility in Africa (JLMP).
■ Harmonize labour migration policy and legal frameworks (MAP).
■ Harmonize required documentation for SADC migrant workers employed within the region and without (SADC LMPF).
■ Harmonize visa requirements for work permits for SADC nationals and third-country nationals (SADC LMPF).
■ Harmonize pension and social security in both private and public schemes (MAP). 
■ Harmonize fundamental rights of migrant workers (MAP).
■ Harmonize work-seekers’ visa requirements for SADC nationals (SADC LMPF).
Guaranteeing Better Work
■ Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women 
migrants, and those in precarious employment (SDG Target 8.8). 
■ Incorporate mechanisms that monitor the provision of decent work for migrants and enable them to access legal provisions for social 
protection (AUF).
■ Provide social protection and social security benefits (particularly unemployment insurance, injury compensation and pensions) for 
labour migrants (AUF).
■ Ensure labour migrants experiencing job losses are adequately provided for or receive financial assistance for return and resettlement 
(AUF).
■ Enable better social and economic integration of migrants, effective labour and social protection mechanisms, and sustainable labour 
market systems (JLMP).
■ Support decent work for migrants with effective application of labour standards to migrant workers (JLMP).
■ Ensure migrant workers have access to social benefits, health services and continuum of care across borders (MAP).
■ Inform potential migrants, returning/seasonal migrants of their rights and of minimum standards, of possibilities to claim those rights 
and report abuses (SADC LMPF).
■ Educate migrant workers, labour representatives and employers regarding the implications of legal requirements (SADC LMPF).
Designing Temporary Programmes 
■ Promote fair recruitment practices (VA). 
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4. Ensuring Rights and Protections for Migrants 
Eliminating Exploitation
■ End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children (SDG Target 16.2). 
■ Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibi-
tion and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in 
all its forms (SDG Target 8.7).
■ Strengthen the capacities of local authorities and civil society to advocate for and protect rights of migrants (VA).
■ Ensure effective implementation by relevant national authorities of existing legislation and measures against employers who exploit 
irregular migrants (VA).
■ Create an enabling environment for migrant rights to be respected including allowing migrants to defend their rights by forming migrant 
associations (AUF).
■ Ensure the respect of the dignity and the protection of the rights to which migrants are entitled under international law, especially the 
right to equal treatment (ACP).
■ Effectively provide protection to abused migrant workers by designing and implementing emergency plans in situations of gross rights 
abuses and safety infringements (SADC LMPF).
■ Harmonize regional labour migration policy in order to protect and guarantee equal rights and access to decent and productive work 
for migrant workers (MAP).
■ Adopt a regional migration policy to ensure the protection of the rights of migrants (SADC EL).
Securing Social Protection
■ Extend social security to migrants through access and portability regimes compatible with international standards and good practice 
(JLMP).
■ Harmonize legislation towards better inclusion of migrant workers into state-provided social services (SADC LMPF). 
■ Harmonize and monitor the delivery of migrant workers’ social rights in the private sector in the framework of a decent work agenda 
across the region (SADC LMPF).
■ Ensure that fundamental rights are accorded to non-citizens, in particular labour/employment and social protection rights (SADC 
Employment).
■ Establish an autonomous regional agency to address cross-cutting issues pertaining to social protection such as streamlining and 
facilitation of portability of social security benefits across borders, stipulating applicable regional minimum standards and regulating 
institutional mechanisms that guarantee relevant entitlements, rights and obligations across borders (SADC Employment).
Countering Xenophobia
■ Encourage the development and implementation of national and regional strategies or policies for integrating migrants into host socie-
ties and for counteracting xenophobia and discrimination (VA). 
■ Promote respect for, and protection of, the rights of labour migrants including combatting discrimination and xenophobia (AUF).
■ Disseminate information about migrants, through public information and education campaigns and other means, to promote respect 
for, tolerance and understanding of migrants, and to counter anti-immigrant and xenophobic attitudes (AUF).
■ Implement the relevant elements from the Programme of Action of the World Conference Against Racism and Xenophobia, including 
measures to ensure the fair and non-discriminatory treatment of migrants, regardless of status, with particular attention to preventing 
discrimination against women and children (AUF).
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5. Facilitating Skills Migration
Removing Barriers 
■ Promote the mobility of students, researchers and entrepreneurs (VA).
■ Maximize the contribution of skilled professionals in the continent by facilitating mobility and deployment of professionals in a conti-
nental and regional framework (AUF).
■ Recognize the relevance of short-term migration and the movement of persons in the context of trade of services, stressing the need 
for more information on the movement of highly skilled workers and on the “trade value” of such moves (AUF).
■ Set up a dialogue between all government agencies dealing with migration, trade and labour issues in order to establish means of 
dealing with temporary movement of persons supplying services (AUF).
■ Encourage the movement of skilled African labour between the host countries and the countries of origin (ACP).
■ Create an environment conducive to circular migration (brain circulation) (ACP).
■ Relax entry requirements for service providers, ensuring non-discriminatory treatment in the terms and conditions of service, as well 
as elimination of the economic needs tests in recruitment (ACP).
■ Boost the growth of a regional skills pool based on facilitated circulation within the region and increased attractiveness (SADC LMPF).
■ Explore the scope for SADC multilateral and bilateral agreements to encourage circular migration of skilled personnel (e.g. twinning 
of medical schools and health care facilities) (SADC LMPF).
Recognizing Qualifications
■ Identify, as a pilot, one or more professions where participating states commit to making progress on facilitating recognition of skills 
and qualifications (VA).
■ Resolve skills shortages and skills-education mismatches while increasing recognition of harmonized qualifications (JLMP).
■ Establish the state of available skills regionally in critical sectors and an inventory of barriers to their circulation (SADC LMPF).
■ Establish the scope for standardization of skills recognition across the SADC (SADC LMPF).
Retaining/Importing/Building Skills
■ By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least-developed 
countries, small island developing states and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and infor-
mation and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing 
countries (SDG Target 4b). 
■ Elaborate a framework for social and economic offsets from host countries to mitigate the effects of large-scale departures of highly 
skilled African professionals in critical sectors (ACP).
6. Adding Value to Remittances
Improving Financial Literacy
■ Support financial education and inclusion of migrants and their families (VA).
■ Encourage the transfer of remittances by adopting sound macro-economic policies conducive to investment and growth and appropri-
ate financial sector policy that encourages financial institutions and their outreach (AUF).
■ Create incentive strategies for remitters in commercial, entrepreneurial, savings and other productive activities (AUF).
Reducing Remittance Costs 
■ By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher 
than 5% (SDG Target 10.C). 
■ By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 
5%. In addition, identify corridors for remittance transfers where the partners commit to substantially reducing the costs by 2020, from 
Europe to Africa and within Africa, in compliance with existing national legislation (VA).
■ Increase the volume of transfers through formal remittance channels (VA).
■ Develop mechanisms, services and effective financial products to facilitate the transfer of funds of emigrants and reduce the costs of 
these transfers (ACP).
■  In co-ordination with the African Institute for Remittances, determine ways to strengthen the infrastructure for remittance transfers that 
can be adopted and modified for implementation by individual states (MAP).
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Optimizing Remittance Uses
■ Implement country-specific programmes, maximizing the impact of remittances notably in rural areas (VA).
■ Explore, identify and promote innovative financial instruments to channel remittances for development purposes (VA).
7. Incorporating Gendered Dimensions of Migration
Promoting Awareness
■ Promote equality of opportunity by strengthening gender-specific approaches to policies and activities concerning labour migration, 
particularly in recognition of the increasing feminization of labour migration (AUF).
■ Integrate a gender perspective in national and regional migration and management policies and strategies (AUF).
■ Promote campaigns to raise awareness about gender dimensions of migration among policy makers and personnel involved in man-
aging migration (AUF).
■ Enhance collection, exchange and utilization of gender and age disaggregated data on migrants’ economic activity, employment, skills, 
education, working conditions and social protection (JLMP).
Supporting Female Migrants
■ Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other 
types of exploitation (SDG Target 5.2).
■ Strengthen responses to the needs of migrant women, particularly ensuring that their health needs, labour rights and human rights 
are respected (AUF).
■ Take effective steps to counter migrant trafficking and smuggling and other illegal practices that specifically target and victimize migrant 
women (AUF).
■ Adopt measures to provide for the special needs of migrant women, children and youth (SADC EL).
8. Building Migrant Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurial Support
■ Create new economic opportunities for young women and men through initiatives focused on, among others, targeted measures to 
create jobs and employment opportunities and stimulate entrepreneurship (VA).
■ Step up support to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the formal and informal sectors including through access to 
finance and micro-loans, training and incubation with particular focus on women, youth and rural populations (VA).
■ Promote migration schemes in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) including training programmes for African entrepreneurs (VA).
■ Create incentive strategies for remitters in commercial, entrepreneurial, savings and other productive activities (AUF).
■ Mainstreaming and harmonization of status and rights of self-employed migrants (SA LMPF).
■ Support to self-employed migrant workers’ organizations (SADC LMPF).
Cross-Border Trade
■ Support economic cross-border activities in border cities and markets (VA).
■ Mapping of main cross-border trade corridors and other activities adopted by self-employed migrants (SADC LMPF).
9. Engaging Diasporas
Building Linkages 
■ Develop country-specific actions aiming at enhancing the development impact of migrant diasporas, both in the EU and associated 
countries and in Africa, to their country of origin. In this context, develop diaspora investment models aimed at leveraging migrants’ sav-
ings for local business development and as a means of boosting local economic development (VA).
■ Further enhance the countries’ outreach to and the knowledge of their diaspora (VA).
■ Encourage entities such as the EU/AC, AU, ILO and IOM to assist in fostering stronger relationships between African states and the 
African diaspora to create enabling conditions for the participation of migrants in the development of their home countries (AUF).
■ Make conscious efforts to reach out to diasporas and create channels of communication with them. Put appropriate institutional mecha-
nisms in place that facilitate such communication and study the needs and incentives that might be required (AUF).
■ Create mechanisms for the strengthening of links between the countries of origin and African communities in the diaspora (ACP).
■ Develop a comprehensive set of policies and tools, including mapping exercises and outreach, related to diaspora engagement (MAP).
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Encouraging Contributions
■ Encourage nationals abroad to contribute to the development of their state of origin through financial and human capital transfers such 
as short and long term return migration; and the transfer of knowledge and technology (AUF).
■ Promote the effective mobilization and utilization of diaspora funds for investment and development in the public and private sectors 
(AUF).
■ Establish a reliable database on the diaspora to determine its extent and magnitude and to promote networking and collaboration 
between experts in the state of origin and the diaspora (AUF).
■ Work towards the elaboration and implementation of policies that facilitate diaspora participation in the development of African coun-
tries (ACP). 
■ Encourage inputs from the diaspora for the development of their countries of origin in the form of trade and investment activities, transfer 
of funds, competencies, technologies and by permanent or temporary participation in development projects (ACP).
10. Creating a Knowledge Platform 
Migration Data Collection 
■ By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including least developed countries and small island developing 
states, to increase significantly the availability of high quality, timely and reliable data that is disaggregated by income, gender, age, 
race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts (SDG Target 17.18).
■ Enhance national and regional migration data collection, analysis and exchange to document the conditions and needs of migrant 
workers and their families (AUF).
■ Formulate and implement a common regional data standard and other initiatives to strengthen regional efforts to collect, analyze and 
share accurate basic information and data on the characteristics of migration in each country with a view to fostering migration and 
regional integration (AUF).
■ Enhance data collection, analysis and exchange on labour needs and supply in states of origin and destination in order to match labour 
skills with labour demand through comprehensive regional approaches (AUF).
■ Improve the quality of data on remittances and migration statistics to create a solid basis for policy action on remittances (AUF).
■ Establish a data bank on the scope of the brain drain phenomenon and qualified human resources (ACP).
■ Obtain relevant and comparable labour migration and labour market data (JLMP).
■ Develop standardized systems for data collection and analysis and harmonized migration indicators to be included in household 
surveys (MAP).
■ Make arrangements for better collection, management and sharing of data (SADC LMPF).
■ Standardize data collection mechanisms across member states from census and border control data sets (SADC LMPF).
■ Standardize migration modules within labour market surveys (SADC LMPF).
■ Mapping of industrial sectors reliant on migrant workers and understanding of the nature of reliance (SADC LMPF).
■ Mapping of socio-economic actors involved in the organization of low-skilled labour migration (labour brokers, recruitment agencies, 
ethnic networks and associations) (SADC LMPF).
Information Exchange
■ Ensure greater co-ordination between ministries and research institutions gathering migration data, including the establishment of a 
migration statistics unit responsible for co-ordinating the gathering of migration statistics (AUF).
■ Constitution of a regional forum for exchange of information, experience and perspective among governments, and through which 
a stocktaking of existing mechanisms and data could be undertaken, and bilateral and multilateral possibilities for data harmonization 
considered (AUF).
■ Establish appropriate mechanisms to bring together national focal points in charge of migration for regular information exchange (ACP).
■ Increase availability of data and statistics on migration (MAP).
■ Update the MIDSA Report on Migration Data Harmonization (published in 2007) for the purpose of identifying gaps in the collection, 
analysis, dissemination and harmonization of migration data (MAP).
■ Create a regular data collection mechanism and accessible platform within one existing member state statistics agency (SADC LMPF).
■ Promote labour migration data collection, analysis and exchange at regional and national levels (SADC Employment).
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OPPORTUNITIES ASSESSMENT
•	 The	 SADC	 Secretariat	 has	 not	 been	 a	 leader	 to	 date	
in advancing a regional migration and development 
agenda, primarily because of capacity challenges and the 
responses of member states to past initiatives. EU support 
for the Secretariat may change this situation with several 
initiatives in planning or early stages of implementation. 
MIDSA offers a more flexible institutional structure but 
its ad hoc and non-binding nature means that an eval-
uation of its impact to date is a pre-condition for any 
support. 
•	 Many	of	the	recommended	actions	in	the	AU	and	SADC	
instruments have not yet been acted on and those that 
have tend to be targeted more at national governments 
than the region as a whole.
•	 The	non-ratification	of	the	key	SADC	migration-related	
protocols means that stakeholder engagement with a 
view to furthering ratification of protocols is unlikely to 
yield substantive results. The lukewarm reaction of mem-
ber states to ratification of key instruments renders it 
unlikely that a donor-driven lobbying and implementa-
tion programme would achieve the desired effect. Donor 
funds are better spent on programming that would have 
as an outcome a clear demonstration to governments 
and regional bodies that migration does and can have 
beneficial migration and inclusive growth impacts for 
both countries of origin and destination.
•	 The	Valetta	Accord	and	AU	Migration	Framework	and	
Common Position offer the SADC Secretariat an oppor-
tunity to take a lead role in designing and implementing 
programmes on migration for development and inclusive 
growth. In addition, the SADC Labour Migration Frame-
work offers potential opportunities for optimizing the 
benefits of labour migration for employment purposes 
and, in particular, the target of each member state hav-
ing a national labour migration policy by 2019. However, 
the EU, ILO and the IOM are already fully engaged with 
the SADC Secretariat on the latter. The new round of 
EU funding for regional institution strengthening sug-
gests that DFID regional programming might be better 
directed elsewhere.
•	 Harnessing	migration	 for	development	and	 inclusive	
growth is not yet a priority for SADC member states. 
Regional programming would therefore more profitably 
be directed at projects and programmes of regional scope 
with the potential for a strong demonstration effect that 
at the same time bring tangible support and benefit to 
the target migrant groups and populations. The next 
section of the report develops this idea further by set-
ting out a programming framework of potential actions 
for harnessing migration for development and inclusive 
growth and then using this framework to classify existing 
initiatives and identify areas of potential intervention.
•	 One	possible	alternative	point	of	regional	institutional	
engagement would be ongoing support for and strength-
ening of the MIDSA process. However, it is imperative to 
commission a comprehensive evaluation of the MIDSA 
process from its inception in order to assess its activi-
ties, achievements, outcomes and impacts with a view to 
determining whether it is a suitable vehicle for advanc-
ing a regional migration agenda on development and 
inclusive growth with tangible results. Potential points 
of intervention and leverage that could be facilitated and 
supported would need to be identified. A subsidiary point 
is that MIDSA is still largely reliant on donor funding and 
would, at the very least, require matching contributions 
from member states to ensure long-term self-reliance and 
sustainability.
•	 Some	of	the	key	areas	for	programming	identified	in	the	
analysis have received limited attention, for example, 
skills migration, women’s migration, remittance uses, 
diaspora engagement and migrant entrepreneurship. 
Research Priorities
■ Encourage research to generate information, identify problems and devise appropriate responses and strategies (AUF).
■ Explore the possibility of co-ordi nating studies and research on migration and development by existing institutions with a view to placing 
current and reliable information on migration at the disposal of states, sub-regional organizations and other users (ACP).
■ Initiate a SADC-wide migration profile study with a view to having a comprehensive overview of migration patterns and profiles within 
the SADC region and assessing the implications for policy development at the national and regional level (MAP).
■ Mapping of regional migration corridors of low-skilled workers (SADC LMPF).
Capacity-Building
■ Conduct training workshops on migration data collection, analysis and dissemination for participants from national statistical offices, 
national migration institutes and the SADC Statistical Department (MIDSA).
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•	 The	 challenge	 is	 to	 devise	 programmes	 that	 have	 a	
regional remit and impact and take account of the 
complexity of migration movements. The number of 
potential programming partners with regional capacity 
and focus is accordingly limited.
•	 While	there	is	a	growing	research	literature	on	migra-
tion and development, much of this is focused on South 
Africa and there is a dearth of regionally focused research 
programmes. 
•	 Other	 regional	programmes,	 such	as	 the	Freedom	 in	
Work programme in Asia, offer potential models but the 
issues and challenges in Southern Africa are somewhat 
different and would require reconfiguration for the spe-
cificities of this region.
STAKEHOLDER 
RECOMMENDATIONS
At the conclusion of the field interviews, the regional and 
national stakeholders were asked for their opinions on 
proposed directions and priorities for a new regional pro-
gramme. NVIVO analysis showed a clear concern with three 
areas: (a) the existing governance mechanisms for migration 
management at the regional level and doubts about their 
capacity and effectiveness; (b) the absence or lack of a broad 
public and governmental awareness and recognition of the 
positive development impacts and implications of migra-
tion within, to and from Southern Africa; and (c) the large 
knowledge and information gaps that exist and how these 
might be addressed. We have used these three concerns to 
group, consolidate and classify specific recommendations. 
Proposal Comment
Migration Governance
Interventions should focus on migration “push factors” in coun-
tries of origin including high rates of unemployment, poverty and 
inequality 
Projects to address the perceived drivers of migration assume that 
migration is detrimental and have not been shown to be effective 
FMM West Africa (the EU-ECOWAS programme) to support free 
movement of persons and migration in West Africa could serve as 
a model for Southern Africa
The new EU programme in support of SADC, COMESA and EAC 
is partially modelled on FMM West Africa
Support and technical assistance could be provided to the SADC 
Secretariat to facilitate ratification of the protocols and free 
movement
The new EU programme in support of SADC, COMESA and EAC 
is designed to provide such support
Support and technical assistance should be provided to member 
states to facilitate national labour migration plans and to integrate 
migration into national development planning
IOM and ILO are committed to implementing both of these 
suggestions 
Support the implementation of the MIDSA process and identify 
areas to leverage for lobbying and advocacy
An evaluation of MIDSA’s achievements and potential is needed to 
identify activities for support 
Migration Capacity-Building
Design and implement an in-service programme for capacity-
building in migration management for development for government 
officials, as well as civil society and unions
Such a programme operated at the University of the Witwatersrand 
between 2006 and 2010. Evaluations were positive but the pro-
gramme was expensive without matching funding from governments 
Integrate migration and development into the curricula of all exist-
ing training programmes including home affairs and labour officials, 
police officers, nurses, social welfare staff, judiciary, prosecutors, 
and teachers as a means of making input on migration more acces-
sible to those who would be dealing with migrants directly and on 
a daily basis
Prior to action on this suggestion, it would be necessary to compile 
a complete inventory of training courses (regional and national), to 
evaluate existing curricula and to design modules on harnessing 
migration for development
Design and implement a professional degree (MA) programme 
in Migration and Development to build the capacity and techni-
cal expertise of government, civil society, private sector and union 
planners and decision-makers, as well as building a regional pool 
of expertise 
Discussions with Statistics South Africa suggest that they could be 
interested in such a programme
Migrant Working Conditions
Improve the recruiting and working conditions of migrants, particu-
larly women, in agriculture and domestic service 
Some programmes are already targeting this issue though most 
are not regional but focus on one country. The idea of undertaking 
a pilot temporary work programme was mooted by TEBA. Further 
discussion would be necessary as the company has tried, without 
success, to extend the service it provides to mineworkers to the 
agricultural and domestic work sectors 
TABLE 16: STAKEHOLDER PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS
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GENDER AND MIGRATION  
PROGRAMMING FOR  
DEVELOPMENT AND  
INCLUSIVE GROWTH
The Programming Framework can be used by stakeholders 
as a tool to identify potential development-related migra-
tion programmes and interventions. We reviewed existing 
programming in Southern Africa and identified themes and 
areas that are relatively neglected or underdeveloped and 
could constitute central entry points for programming. The 
PF is reproduced below with the recommended action areas 
highlighted. 
Our main recommendation is for a programme on Gen-
der and Migration for Development and Inclusive Growth 
in Southern Africa. Our general starting point is the July 
2016 ODI Briefing Paper “Women on the Move: Migration, 
Gender Equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment” and the UN-INSTRAW/UNDP Report on “Gender, 
TABLE 17: PROPOSED ENTRY POINTS IN PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK
Issue Entry Points
Ensuring Rights and Protections for Migrants Eliminating Exploitation 
Adding Value to Remittances Optimizing Remittance Uses
Incorporating Gender Dimensions of Migration Supporting Female Migrants
Building Migrant Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurial Support
Engaging Diasporas Encouraging Contributions
Creating a Knowledge Platform Research Priorities
Focus on the area of migrant protection. This could include work 
at institutional level; for example, strengthening the national refer-
ral mechanism for victims of trafficking, unaccompanied migrant 
children and vulnerable migrants, training on migrant protection, 
working with multi-sectoral groups at border posts across the 
region, such as border guards and social services. Such training 
could include screening for vulnerabilities, proper referral, provi-
sion of protection, and voluntary return and reintegration strategies
This suggestion needs to be considered seriously either as an 
objective in itself (along the lines of previous IOM programming) 
or as one element of a more targeted programme, e.g. focused on 
domestic workers or farmworkers
Continue work on remittances. Conduct a study on the usage and 
impact of remittances and use the study to develop a community 
development programme so that remittances are not used only 
for basic needs but also for setting up businesses and investment
FinMark Trust has worked on remittances flows and reducing 
remittance costs. The next logical step is to design and support 
innovative programmes that encourage the productive use of 
investments 
Develop a framework and roadmap for small-scale traders 
This proposal was the only one to target the informal economy 
explicitly. Although there was no indication what the roadmap would 
achieve, it could be the first step in a larger programme of support 
for informal entrepreneurship
Facilitate engagement with the diaspora 
No additional suggestions were provided but diaspora engagement 
is a central pillar of the instruments reviewed and migration and 
development programming more generally
Migration Data Collection and Use
Help to generate the evidence that would dispel myths about migra-
tion and demonstrate that it has positive development outcomes for 
countries of origin and destination and migrants themselves
There are major gaps in our understanding of migration at the 
regional level and a great deal of misinformation that leads to nega-
tive and xenophobic outcomes. Most research to date has focused 
on proving the existence of rights abuse, understanding its causes 
and documenting the hardships experienced by migrants. There 
is much less evidence on migrants as active agents, seeking to 
better their lives and generating positive impacts for development 
and inclusive growth 
Support the collection, analysis and use of migration data across 
the region as an aid to policy-making. This could be a combination 
of collecting and collating existing data and generating new data 
through modules in labour force surveys and dedicated household 
migration surveys 
Some respondents thought it would be useful to have a central 
facility for the collection, organization and dissemination of migra-
tion data at the regional level; others were sceptical. Some were 
hesitant about having a central facility for the collection, organiza-
tion and dissemination of migration data at the regional level but 
thought it could work if there were clear agreements on who would 
use it. It was mentioned that it could have potential if it was inde-
pendently run but it would not be sustainable if donor funding runs 
out. Data collection and management is already a central pillar of 
the new EU regional support programme though the details have 
yet to be worked out
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Migration and Gender-Responsive Local Development”.81 
As the latter notes:
Studying the phenomena of migration and remittances 
from a gender perspective…has yielded an understand-
ing of the differences between women’s and men’s 
migratory experiences, the ways in which gender rela-
tions are influenced or reinforced, and which factors 
promote greater gender equity. In order for women’s 
participation in the migratory process to contribute to 
development, both in origin and destination countries, 
it is necessary to go beyond isolated micro-projects in 
order to enact public policies that eliminate obstacles 
to their autonomy. The rise in women’s independent 
migration can increase their decision-making power, 
but certain factors must be taken into account in order 
to guarantee equitable development including: the divi-
sion of reproductive labour, access to education and 
equal pay, access to land and credit and the guaran-
tee of their rights of association and labour, among 
others.82
Entry Point One: Building a Gendered 
Knowledge Base
One of the recurrent themes in the stakeholder interviews 
was (a) the limited public availability and utility of official 
data on migration; and (b) the lack of knowledge about 
migration causes, volumes, experiences and impacts. The 
information that does exist comes from “add-on” questions 
to national or sample surveys designed for other purposes 
and small-scale, local case studies on migration whose 
findings are not necessarily representative of the wider pop-
ulation of migrants. A common failing of official data and 
the case-study research literature is the absence of system-
atic and generalizable information on the gendered nature 
of migration. In order to provide detailed, policy-relevant, 
gender-disaggregated data on migration and its development 
impacts, a different methodological approach is needed. Our 
recommendation is for the collection of national migra-
tion data at the household level in countries of origin and 
destination through the implementation of nationally rep-
resentative surveys of migrant-sending households. 
The knowledge and policy value of this kind of methodol-
ogy is clearly illustrated by previous projects whose findings 
are widely cited as the only authoritative sources of data on 
all aspects of migration in the SADC region, including its 
gender dimensions. Survey instruments and sampling strate-
gies should be designed and implemented in such a way as 
to permit not merely comparison between male and female 
migrants, but knowledge and understanding of various 
household forms and intra-household gender relations and 
dynamics as they affect and are affected by migration. These 
surveys would ensure the collection of gender-disaggregated 
data on a range of critical migration and development issues 
including migration drivers, migrant characteristics and 
motivations, migrant occupations and remitting behav-
iour, remittance channels and uses, and general migration 
impacts at the household, community and national scales.
Only two countries in the SADC have conducted National 
Migration Surveys in the past: Botswana in 1980 and 
Namibia in 1998. Both surveys provided detailed insights 
into the dimensions and drivers of internal and interna-
tional migration in these countries at the time but are now 
extremely dated. The World Bank and African Development 
Bank Africa Migration Project conducted Migration and 
Remittances Household Surveys in Burkina Faso, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda in 2009-2010. 
The surveys used a standardized methodology developed by 
the World Bank and were conducted by primarily country-
based researchers and institutions during 2009 and 2010. 
They covered recent migration and remittance trends, hous-
ing conditions, household assets and expenditures, use of 
financial services, internal and international migration and 
remittances from former and non-former household mem-
bers. Collectively, say the Banks, “these surveys provide 
unique data and a new research methodology for collecting 
information on migration and remittances in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.”83 
The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) con-
ducted two nationally representative household surveys 
in six countries in the SADC (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) in 2005 and 
2006. The first (the Migration and Remittances Survey or 
MARS) focused on migrant-sending households, while the 
second (the Migration and Poverty Survey or MAPS) sam-
pled migrant and non-migrant households. The surveys 
covered a wide range of household and individual migrant 
characteristics, migration motives and behaviours, migrant 
occupations and remitting practices, and the relationship 
between migration and local development as well as migra-
tion and gender.84 These surveys have and continue to be 
widely cited but represent the situation a decade ago. They 
do not capture, for example, recent evidence that some 
migration streams are becoming more permanent in nature.
We recommend another round of national migration sur-
veys using these tested methodologies and instruments in as 
many SADC countries as funding allows. There is an urgent 
need for the kind of current and comprehensive data and 
information that such surveys provide. As well as providing 
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the critical gender-disaggregated information on migration 
and development that does not currently exist, the findings 
could be used to build the evidence-based demonstration 
effect of the possibilities for further harnessing migration 
for development and inclusive growth. The data would also 
inform the development and implementation of the other 
work packages suggested below. Potential outcomes include 
the following:
•	 Filling	of	information	and	data	gaps	on	the	relationships	
between migration, development and inclusive growth; 
•	 Current,	actionable	information	on	migration	dynam-
ics and development impacts and potential in countries 
of origin and destination, including differentiation by 
gender and household type;
•	 Demonstration	effect	of	positive	development	implica-
tions of migration by men and women in the region, 
to support regional co-operation and management ini-
tiatives including ratification of protocols and other 
regional initiatives such as MIDSA; and
•	 Design	 of	 gender-based	 programmes	 and	 interven-
tions based on solid and reliable information on gender 
dimensions of migration.
Entry Point Two: Protecting Female 
Migrants in Domestic Work
The SADC Labour Migration Framework has as two of its 
objectives (a) strengthening protection of the rights of 
migrant workers; and (b) harnessing positive gender con-
siderations and demographic dividends. These objectives 
urgently need to be realized in the low-wage sectors in 
which migrant women and girls tend to concentrate, espe-
cially domestic work. The Preamble to the 2011 Domestic 
Workers Convention notes that “domestic work continues 
to be undervalued and invisible and is mainly carried out 
by women and girls, many of whom are migrants or mem-
bers of disadvantaged communities and who are particularly 
vulnerable to discrimination in respect of conditions of 
employment and of work, and to other abuses of human 
rights.”85 A programme focus on the rights and protection 
of women and girl migrants would materially advance these 
objectives and potentially enhance implementation of the 
Labour Migration Framework and the Domestic Workers 
Convention.
The field research confirmed that several civil society groups, 
NGOs, unions and international organizations are beginning 
to focus their attention on the precarious employment of 
migrant women. We therefore recommend a regional pro-
gramme directed at improving the conditions for women 
and youth migrating to and working in the domestic service 
sector. Existing research tends to be of a narrow case-study 
nature but has identified some of the major challenges faced 
by women migrants recruited by labour brokers and oth-
ers, travelling to places of employment, poor treatment by 
employers and constant vulnerability to exploitation and 
deportation due to uncertain legal status. The obligations 
enshrined in the Domestic Workers Convention contain 
commitments to domestic workers for the effective promo-
tion and protection of human rights including the right 
to freedom of association and collective bargaining; the 
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the 
effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of dis-
crimination in respect of employment and occupation. The 
Convention also promotes the need for a minimum wage; 
the right to a safe and healthy work environment; effec-
tive protection against all forms of abuse, harassment and 
violence; enjoyment of fair terms of employment as well as 
decent working and living conditions; the use by employers 
of appropriate, verifiable and easily understandable written 
contracts; social security protection and effective access to 
courts, tribunals and other dispute resolution mechanisms.
The precarious legal position of migrant domestic workers 
makes it easier for employers to circumvent some or all of 
these commitments. The Convention also elucidates several 
goals that apply specifically to migrants including that: 
•	 Migrant	domestic	workers	who	are	recruited	in	one	coun-
try for domestic work in another receive a written job 
offer, or contract of employment that is enforceable in 
the country in which the work is to be performed, prior 
to crossing national borders for the purpose of taking up 
the domestic work to which the offer or contract applies; 
and
•	 To	 effectively	 protect	 domestic	 workers,	 including	
migrant domestic workers recruited or placed by pri-
vate employment agencies, against abusive practices, it 
is necessary to (a) determine the conditions governing 
the operation of private employment agencies recruiting 
or placing domestic workers; (b) ensure that adequate 
machinery and procedures exist for the investigation of 
complaints, alleged abuses and fraudulent practices con-
cerning the activities of private employment agencies 
in relation to domestic workers; (c) adopt all necessary 
and appropriate measures to provide adequate protection 
for and prevent abuses of domestic workers recruited or 
placed in its territory by private employment agencies; 
(d) recruiting of domestic workers in one country for 
work in another should ideally be governed by bilateral, 
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regional or multilateral agreements to prevent abuses 
and fraudulent practices in recruitment, placement 
and employment; and (e) take measures to ensure that 
fees charged by private employment agencies are not 
deducted from the remuneration of domestic workers.
The extent to which employers, labour brokers and govern-
ments are in breach of the Convention is unknown and 
needs to be systematically researched. The largely informal, 
unorganized nature of domestic worker recruitment in this 
region makes it difficult to assess or monitor, but this only 
adds to the urgency of doing so. Further, programmes to 
inform and educate domestic workers of their rights, and 
employers and employment agencies of their obligations, 
are needed.
Because most migrant women in domestic work tend to 
move along major migration corridors, there is a strong 
case for adopting a corridor-focused approach to programme 
implementation. Two corridors, in particular, are known 
to be significant avenues for migrant women in domestic 
work: the Zimbabwe-Gauteng-Western Cape corridor and the 
Lesotho-Gauteng corridor. By focusing attention on these 
two corridors, identifying the challenges and obstacles fac-
ing migrant domestic workers and materially affecting the 
employment conditions of migrant women, this work pack-
age can have a strong demonstration effect on the need to 
protect and guarantee the rights of vulnerable workers and 
ensure that they benefit from, and contribute to, inclusive 
economic growth. 
The Work in Freedom programme in Asia is a potential 
model for integrated programming on migrant domestic 
worker protection in Southern Africa and therefore requires 
additional comment. Its primary aim is to combat trafficking 
in women and girls from South-East Asia to the garment and 
domestic work sectors in major destination countries includ-
ing Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. While 
trafficking is a concern in Southern Africa generally, there 
is less evidence that it is a significant problem in relation 
to employment in domestic service. The Work in Freedom 
programme has a main focus on promoting ethical and good 
industry practices among the intermediaries between coun-
tries of origin and destination in the so-called “recruitment 
industry.” 
The primary differences between the Work in Freedom cor-
ridors and those in Southern Africa are (a) the length and 
complexity of navigating the corridors. In Southern Africa, 
geographical proximity and ease of overland travel by mini-
bus taxi means that informal, individualized migration is 
much more feasible; (b) the reliance of Asian migrants on 
unscrupulous intermediaries given the cost and logistical 
challenges of long-distance migration. While there is some 
evidence of the involvement of formal and informal labour 
brokers in recruiting and placing farm and domestic work-
ers, more research is needed on how the system works and if 
and how the basic rights of migrants are violated; (c) while 
migrants in the Work in Freedom corridors are generally 
working legally in the destination country, this is not often 
the case in Southern Africa. Because irregular migration and 
work status make migrants vulnerable to a set of abuses in 
the workplace and in the neighbourhoods in which they 
live, this would need to be a central focus in a programme 
for Southern Africa.
Potential outcomes of programming in this area include the 
following:
•	 Implementation	 and	monitoring	 of	 the	 protections	
enshrined in the Domestic Workers Convention in coun-
tries that have ratified the Convention;
•	 Identification	of	practices	that	are	in	breach	of	the	Con-
vention in non-ratifying countries; 
•	 New	and	better	evidence	generated	on	women	and	girl	
migrants in low-wage employment and the nature, driv-
ers and impacts of precarious employment in domestic 
work;
•	 Women	and	girls	enjoy	greater	protection	while	migrat-
ing and in the workplace in low-wage sectors; 
•	 Maximizing	economic	and	other	benefits	to	households	
and communities from the migration of women and girls 
into low-wage sectors in other countries;
•	 Private	sector	recruitment	agencies	and	labour	brokers	
adopt ethical principles and practices, in line with fair 
recruitment standards; and
•	 New	legal	or	policy	initiatives	are	implemented	to	protect	
and guarantee the rights of women migrant workers (in 
transit and in the workplace).
Entry Point Three: Maximizing  
Remittance Impacts for Women 
Migrants
Several programmes have been designed to understand 
remitting practices and channels, improve financial liter-
acy and reduce the costs of remitting, especially by SAMP 
(2005-2008)86 and FinMark Trust.87 With the exception of 
one major but dated study by SAMP, little attention has been 
paid to the gender dimensions of remitting in Southern 
Africa.88 The SAMP study suggested that: 
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•	 For	most	migrant-sending	households,	migrant	remit-
tances form the main source of household income. The 
proportion of male and female migrants sending remit-
tances varied from country to country but was over 
two-thirds of all female migrants in each country;
•	 The	amounts	of	money	remitted	by	female	migrants	were	
significantly lower than those of male migrants, in part 
reflecting women migrants’ lower levels of income and 
employment security. However, women remit a greater 
proportion of their earnings;
•	 Lesotho’s	 female	migrants	 remitted	 larger	 sums	than	
female migrants from any of the other countries; 
•	 Many	 female	 migrants	 come	 from	 female-centred	
households, with no husband or male partner. Women’s 
remittances are especially significant to such house-
holds as the primary – often only – source of household 
income; 
•	 The	main	uses	of	remittances	from	both	male	and	female	
migrant-sending households were expenditures on the 
basic commodities of food, domestic fuel and clothing, 
and fundamental services such as schooling, health care 
and transport;
•	 There	were	important	gender	differences,	as	well	as	dif-
ferences between countries, in the amounts of monthly 
expenditure on particular categories of expenses; and 
•	 As	 the	primary	 source	of	 income	 for	 the	majority	of	
households, remittance earnings are vital in enabling 
households to meet their basic needs. Food is the most 
common annual expenditure of remittance money in 
both male and female migrant-sending households. 
Second in all countries is either clothing or school fees. 
Remittances do not appear to be spent on non-essential 
or luxury items, but nor are they commonly directed 
towards savings or investment in business or other pro-
ductive activities. 
While there is a need for updated regional data on the gen-
dered dimensions of remitting (which could be garnered 
through Work Package One), the priority is to devise practi-
cal, actionable programmes of support which would turn 
remittances from meeting basic household consumption 
needs into sources of productive investment by recipients 
at the household and community levels. There are anec-
dotal examples of this: for example, Lesotho’s spaza shops 
and taxi-cab industries were largely financed in the start-up 
phase by migrant remittances. However, this work package 
should seek to understand, perhaps through pilot studies, (a) 
the kinds of self-help organizations established by women 
(including stokvels, savings clubs, burial societies, egg cir-
cles and co-operatives) and the ways in which individual 
and collective remitting might enhance their activities; (b) 
how financial remittances might enhance and meet wom-
en’s micro-entrepreneurship needs for start-up and working 
capital, perhaps through financial matching programmes; 
and (c) whether there is evidence of social remittances, such 
as changed perceptions of gender roles, affecting women’s 
economic and entrepreneurial activity in migrant-sending 
communities.
There is considerable global and regional debate about how 
best to harness remittances for development and inclusive 
growth.89 The available evidence suggests that remittances 
build three forms of capital: (a) human capital through 
expenditures on food purchase, education, clothing, shelter, 
transportation and medical expenses. This shows the impor-
tance of remittances to the well-being of the household and 
especially its younger members (through improved food 
security, education and health); (b) physical capital through 
savings and investment in, for example, agricultural inputs 
such as seed, fertilizer and tractor hire; and (c) financial capi-
tal through micro-enterprise start-ups and expansion. The 
impacts of remitting on physical and financial capital remain 
largely in the realm of assertion rather than demonstration. 
IFAD’s Scaling Up Remittances (SURE) programme is a 
potential model for this programme. As IFAD notes, “the 
impact of remittances is dramatically enhanced when linked 
to other financial services such as savings, insurance and 
loan products. Inclusive financial systems and innovative 
partnerships between financial institutions and remittance 
operators can produce significant benefits by easing competi-
tion and reducing costs, thereby offering more resources to 
the poor and increased options for families to use their capi-
tal to its maximum potential. In addition, migrants’ capital 
savings have been proven successful at promoting entrepre-
neurship and local economic development back home.”90 
IFAD’s rural focus assumes, as does much of the literature, 
that such programmes should be rural-focused whereas it is 
actually more likely that opportunities for the productive 
use of remittances are greater in urban areas. Thus, we sug-
gest that programming should focus more on urban-urban 
remitting to have tangible results and benefits for inclusive 
growth. Potential outcomes include:
•	 Improved	 knowledge	 base	 on	 the	uses	 of	 individual	
and collective remittances by recipient households and 
communities including support for productive use of 
remittances to establish and grow micro-enterprises 
(especially by women and youth), the extent and poten-
tial of collective remitting as a source of start-up capital 
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and obstacles and challenges faced by actual and poten-
tial micro-entrepreneurs;
•	 Identification	of	obstacles,	challenges	and	opportuni-
ties for leveraging remittances to foster micro-enterprise 
start-ups and development;
•	 Demonstration	effect	of	support	of	innovative,	best-prac-
tice solutions for productive use of remittances; and 
•	 Micro-enterprises	developed	and	job	creation	enhanced,	
especially by women entrepreneurs, as part of the pro-
gramme to harness remittances for development and 
inclusive growth.
Entry Point Four: Enhancing Female 
Migrant Entrepreneurship
In cities throughout South Africa, migrants from other 
countries (including forced migrants) are involved in the 
establishment of small businesses to support themselves 
and their families and to generate remittances to send back 
to	their	home	countries.	As	many	as	60%	of	migrant	small	
business owners in South Africa are remitters. There is a 
common (mis)perception that migrant entrepreneurs are 
“survivalists,” forced to establish their businesses because of 
a failure to obtain formal employment and operating with 
razor thin margins. However, there is a growing body of 
research that highlights the entrepreneurial orientation and 
motivation of the majority of migrant business owners. Their 
innovative business strategies have also been highlighted, 
as have the challenges they face in establishing, operating 
and growing their businesses. Studies have identified the 
following as major business challenges: (a) economic chal-
lenges including shortages of start-up capital, lack of access 
to credit, competition from formal sector outlets and sup-
pliers over-charging; (b) social challenges such as prejudice 
against their nationality and xenophobic attacks; and (c) 
security challenges such as crime and theft, confiscation of 
goods by the police, harassment and demands for bribes and 
protection money, and physical attacks by the police. Most 
migrant entrepreneurs start their businesses with personal 
savings as they are unable to access bank loans and other 
sources of start-up capital. 
Despite these problems, migrant entrepreneurs deliver 
important development benefits to countries of origin 
(through remittances) and destination (including cheaper 
foodstuffs and consumables, credit facilities, and job crea-
tion, as well as generating economic profits for formal sector 
suppliers such as wholesalers and supermarkets). One aspect 
of migrant entrepreneurship in which women are particu-
larly involved is running businesses in their own countries 
and using cross-border trading as a strategy to build their 
businesses, profits and impacts. Migrant entrepreneurs are 
still in need of various programmes of support to address 
some of the challenges they face and to maximize their entre-
preneurial activities and contributions. There is a dearth of 
programmes supporting migrant women’s small and micro-
entrepreneurship activities and initiatives in Southern Africa. 
Migrants are generally excluded from government training 
and support programmes. 
There are several models that could be used and adapted to 
the specific circumstances of actual and aspirant migrant 
women entrepreneurs in SADC. These include the US African 
Women’s Entrepreneurship Program, which is described as an 
outreach, education and engagement initiative that targets 
African women entrepreneurs to promote business growth, 
increase trade, create better business environments, and 
empower African women entrepreneurs to become voices 
of change in their communities.91 Another example is the 
ILO’s Women’s Entrepreneurship Development Programme, 
which “works with service providers promoting entrepre-
neurship development (financial, non-financial, public, 
private, associative, freelance) and builds their capacity to 
better support women entrepreneurs to start and grow their 
businesses. It also works towards creating a more positive 
enabling environment for WED, by supporting assessments 
of the situation, and working with governments and policy 
makers to remove the specific gender barriers that women 
entrepreneurs may face.”92 This programme has primarily 
focused on East Africa but a similar programme in Southern 
Africa would be of considerable benefit. Potential outcomes 
of programming are as follows:
•	 New	knowledge	for	public	education	and	policy-mak-
ing on the contributions of male and female migrant 
entrepreneurs to the development of host and home 
countries;
•	 Improved	 regulatory	 and	operating	 environment	 for	
migrant entrepreneurship;
•	 Ability	of	migrant	entrepreneurs	to	run	businesses	more	
effectively and profitably, create jobs and enter partner-
ships with local entrepreneurs;
•	 Empowering	 of	 women	 migrant	 entrepreneurs	 to	
establish and grow their in-country and cross-border 
businesses; and
•	 Development	of	best-practice	solutions	to	assist	growth	
of migrant-owned SMEs across the region. 
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Entry Point Five: Deploying Diaspora 
Skills for Women/Youth Empowerment
There is growing interest in the actual and potential role of 
diasporas as a resource for development and inclusive growth 
in Africa. Chikezie argues that diasporas possess five forms 
of diaspora capital (the “5 Cs”): intellectual capital, financial 
capital, political capital, cultural capital and social capital.93 
In order for African governments and regional organizations 
to engage effectively with diasporas, it is important to under-
stand what motivates diasporas to be involved in African 
development: the “3 Ps” of pecuniary interests, private inter-
ests and public philanthropic interests.94 As noted above, the 
Southern African region has a significant global diaspora. 
Most diaspora engagement programmes and projects have 
been developed by national governments (though Southern 
African governments are not generally among them). How-
ever, “in reinforcing the African diaspora’s contribution to 
development, there remains a critical role for regional bod-
ies…and even regional economic institutions.”95
The global Southern African diaspora represents a large 
skills and expertise pool, several million strong, that has 
not yet been effectively leveraged for development by 
Southern African countries. Some countries, such as Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, have official diaspora engagement poli-
cies. Others are being developed (Table 18). South Africa 
has declared its intention to engage with the diaspora in 
the new Green Paper. The Zambian government has been 
the most proactive, establishing a Diaspora Liaison Office 
at Presidential level. Most recently, in September 2015, 
TABLE 18: DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES OF SADC GOVERNMENTS
Country/
Region Policy Initiatives and Institutions Priorities
AU
Citizens and Diaspora Directorate http://www.african-union.africa-newsroom.com/
press/citizens-and-diaspora-directorate-cido-towards-creating-a-diaspora-engage-
ment-toolkit?lang=en
Facilitate diaspora engage-
ment activities and policies 
Diaspora engagement toolkit
Angola Institute of the Angolan Communities Abroad and Consulate Affairs Business investment consu-lar workshops
Botswana No formal policies
DRC96 No formal policies
Lesotho97 No formal policies
Mauritius Mauritius Diaspora Scheme http://www.diaspora.mu/government.aspx Return migration
Madagascar 2015 Diaspora Directorate http://www.diplomatie.gov.mg/index.php?categorie10/diaspora-malagasy
Strengthening linkages, 
socio-economic projects, 
promoting youth
Malawi 2012 Diaspora Engagement Programme and Diaspora Affairs Unit in Ministry Co-operation http://www.foreignaffairs.gov.mw/index.php/diaspora-services/overview
Remittances, investments, 
skills transfer
Mozambique
2014 Strategy for Diaspora Engagement in National Development https://www.iom.
int/news/mozambique-launches-diaspora-engagement-strategy 
National Institute for Mozambican Communities in the Diaspora (INACE) 
IOM Diaspora Engagement Project https://developmentfund.iom.int/news/
iom-mozambique-launch-diaspora-engagement-project
Develop national diaspora 
engagement policy
Namibia Diaspora policy in development https://www.nbc.na/news/namibia-develop-migration-policy-namibians-diaspora.1004
South Africa98
Hosted 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit http://www.dirco.gov.za/diaspora/index.
html 
Diaspora engagement policy proposed in 2016 Green Paper on International 
Migration
Swaziland No formal policies
Tanzania99
Diaspora Engagement and Opportunity Department in Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and International Development (MFAIC) http://www.foreign.go.tz/index.php/en/about/
diaspora-engagement-and-opportunities-division 
Tanzania Diaspora Conference 2016 http://tzdiaspora.org/concept-notes.html 
Zanzibar Diaspora http://www.zanzibardiaspora.go.tz/
Investment, tourism, diaspora 
database
Zambia Diaspora Liaison Office in President’s Office National policy framework in development100
Wide-ranging framework of 
activities
Zimbabwe
2016 National Diaspora Policy  
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit-m-cabinet-approves-national-dias-
pora-policy/ 
Zimbabwe National Diaspora Directorate https://www.iom.int/news/
zimbabwe-launches-national-diaspora-directorate
Skills transfer, productive use 
of remittances
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the Zambian diaspora association in the UK (DfAD) organ-
ized a conference in London on Southern African Diaspora 
Communities in the UK. DfAD made two main points of 
relevance: first, that policies should facilitate the setup of 
sound and informed regulatory frameworks for the diaspora 
to invest in development and job creation; and second, that 
the policy should ensure the portability of skills and ben-
efits that would recognize the diaspora’s professional and 
vocational qualifications. By identifying the existence of a 
Southern African diaspora, the event went beyond the usual 
conceptualization of individual countries engaging with 
their own national diasporas abroad. This is where there is a 
major programming gap to be filled, i.e. recognition of and 
engagement with the regional diaspora at a regional level.
The general literature on diaspora engagement has identified 
a range of potential areas including remittances, investment, 
philanthropy, tourism, skills and knowledge transfer and 
some countries, such as the Philippines, have instituted a 
range of extremely successful diaspora engagement policies. 
A regional diaspora engagement policy for Southern Africa as 
a whole needs to be based on (a) a mapping of existing devel-
opment-related initiatives by members of diasporas within 
and from Southern Africa; (b) information about the types 
of engagement activities that members of the diaspora are 
interested in supporting or participating in at the regional 
level; for example, Zimbabweans or South Africans abroad 
being willing to engage in skills transfer anywhere in the 
SADC region; and (c) the establishment of mechanisms that 
would enable and facilitate engagement at the regional level, 
perhaps initially in the form of a platform or marketplace for 
being part of or supporting regional projects. To align this 
proposal with the general theme of gender and migration, 
such a programme could have a focus on developing dias-
pora support for projects and programmes that specifically 
target enhancing gender equity and women’s empowerment. 
Highlighting the achievements and tapping the skills of suc-
cessful women in the diaspora could be a potential means 
of changing gender perceptions and empowering women 
in the region. 
Potential outcomes include:
•	 Improved	knowledge	base	on	current	forms	of	regional	
engagement by the Southern African diaspora, including 
the role and significance of gender; 
•	 Creation	of	a	platform	or	marketplace	for	the	exchange	
of ideas and information about engagement possibilities 
at the regional level;
•	 Utilization	by	civil	society	actors	and	the	private	sec-
tor of the skills of men and women in the diaspora in 
development-oriented activities and programmes;
•	 Demonstration	effect	of	successful	skills	and	knowledge	
transfer programme with impact at the regional level; 
and
•	 Commitment	by	members	of	the	diaspora	from	individ-
ual countries to a regional vision of diaspora engagement. 
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APPENDIX A: STAKEHOLDER 
CONSULTATIONS
Fieldwork was undertaken by a team of four fieldwork-
ers from Southern Hemisphere Consulting. Country visits 
were undertaken to South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana 
and Zimbabwe. Interviews were conducted face to face 
in-country, where possible, or telephonically. A total of 60 
interviews with 86 interviewees were done.
Regional-level interviews
Stakeholder group Ministry/organization Detail
DFID regional office DFID Fiona Clark and Joel Harding
Donors and international 
agencies implement-
ing programmes with a 
regional focus
USAID 
USAID Democracy and Governance Regional  
General Development Office
Laura Berger, democracy HR and governance 
team leader 
Paula van Dyk, democracy HR and governance 
senior programme specialist
Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation Juliane Ineichen, deputy regional director of co-operation
Save the Children (Southern and Eastern Africa) Melinda van Zyl, Eastern and Southern Africa sen-ior manager for child migration
Regional organizations 
(intergovernmental and 
non-governmental)
International Alliance of Street Vendor 
Organizations Pat Horn
SADC Cross-Border Traders Association Francis Ngambi
OSISA Alice Kanengoni 
Southern African Trust Christabel Phiri
Finmark Trust Brendan Pearce, head of programmes
Multilaterals
IOM Regional/MIDSA Richard Ots and Jo Rispoli
UNHCR Amanuel Tesfayesus Mehari
UNDP Osten Chulu
ILO Joni Musabayana, Deputy Director: ILO 
Regional organizations
African Union Peter Mudungwe, Migration Advisor for African Union commission
EU Mary Horvers, EU attaché , Regional Co-operation
GIZ
Phillip Madelung, programme manager, Co-
operation for the Enhancement of SADC Regional 
Economic Integration (CESARE)
Country-level interviews for South Africa
Stakeholder group Ministry/organization Detail
Affected groups
Scalabrini Centre Miranda Madikane, Director
Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) Jacob van Garderen and David Cote
Donors and international agencies imple-
menting programmes with a national focus
IOM South Africa Josiah Ogina
EU Delegation to South Africa Belen Calvo, political counsellor
National government representatives (e.g. 
immigration, social welfare, labour)
Statistics South Africa Miranda Mafafo and Themba Mohoto
Department of Health Barry Kistnasamy, Compensation  Commissioner for Occupational Diseases
Department of Home Affairs Lionel Isaacs
Department of Labour Esther Tloane and three colleagues
Academic institutions
GCRO Sally Peberdy
African Centre for Migration & Society: 
University of the Witwatersrand
Ingrid Palmary
Loren Landau
Union COSATU Bongani Masuku, Secretary, International Department
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Country-level interviews for Botswana
Stakeholder group Ministry/organization Detail
Donors
GIZ Sophia Gallina and Adane Ghebremeskel
Frederick-Ebert Stiftung Ulrich Golaszinski
USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub Gregory Maassen and Brian McCotter
Multilaterals
UNHCR Mandipa Machacha
IOM Botswana Sikhulile Dhlamini
Unions Botswana Federation of Trade Unions Gadzani Mhotsha
Academic institutions
University of Botswana Teresa Galvin
University of Botswana David Mandiyanike
Country-level interviews for Mozambique
Stakeholder group Ministry/organization Detail
Donors and international 
agencies implement-
ing programmes with a 
national focus
IOM
Jason Theede, Programme Manager: Labour Migration and 
Development / Migration and Health 
Ruth Krcmar, Programme Coordinator: Migrant Assistance / 
Integrated Border Management
GIZ Peter Pfaumann, Country Director
UN Women Ondina da Barca Vieira, Gender Programme Specialist
Affected groups Mukhero Cross-Border Traders’ Association Novela Sudecar, Director
Unions Mozambique Workers’ Organization (OTM)
Florencio Quetane, Head of Chamber General Secretary 
Antonio Paunde Machuquela, Head of Office of Communi-
cation, Image and International Relations
Academic institutions
Eduardo Mondlane University, Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences, Centre for Policy 
Analysis
Ines Macamo Raimondo, Deputy Dean of Faculty of Arts 
and Social Sciences 
Ramos Cardoso Muanamoha, Chief of Department
Country-level interviews for Zimbabwe
Stakeholder group Ministry/organization Detail
Donor DFID country office (Zimbabwe) Jessica Pettiprez, Social Development Advisor
Affected groups
Cross-Border Traders’ Association Augustine Tawanda, Secretary General Abel Jaridi, Treasurer
Labour and Economic Development 
Research Institute Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ) Nyasha Muchinchwa, Researcher 
Multilaterals
ILO – Zimbabwe and Namibia office
Adolphus Chinomwe, Senior Programme Officer 
Hopolang Phororo, Director
IOM Lily Sanya, head of mission Knowledge Mareyanadzo, government liaison
UN Women Rumbidzai Dube, Senior GBV co-ordinator
UNICEF
Allet Sibanda, programme officer CP 
Noriko Izumi, Chief CP 
Catherine Makoni, Gender and HR Specialist
Government Ministry of Labour
Langton Ngorima, Acting Deputy Director 
M.V. Hanga, Principal Labour Officer 
M Parakokwa, Principal Labour Officer 
T.C. Jongwe, Principal Labour Officer 
S.T. Kadzima, Principal Labour Officer
Private sector Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce C. Mugaga, CEO
Unions Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions Michael Kandukutu, national organizer Fiona Magaya, gender co-ordinator
Academic institution University of Zimbabwe Innocent Chirisa
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